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of Harm
Mark P. McKenna*
ABSTRACT: Modern scholarship takes a decidedly negative view of
trademark law. Commentators rail against doctrinal innovations like
dilution and initial interest confusion. They clamor for clearer and broader
defenses. And they plead for greater First Amendment scrutiny of various
applications of trademark law. But beneath all of this criticism lies
overwhelming agreement that consumer confusion is harmful. This easy
acceptance of the harmfulness of confusion is a problem because it operates
at too high a level of generality, ignoring important differences between types
of relationships about which consumers might be confused. Failure to
differentiate between these dfferent relationships has enabled trademark
owners to push the boundaries of trademark protection, as they have been
able to characterize virtually every use of their marks in consumer confusion
terms.
This Article begins the process of distinguishing types of confusion by
focusing on the supposed harms to producers from confusion regarding the
source of non-competing goods. More specifically, this Article evaluates the
assumptions underlying arguments in favor of protection against non-
competing uses in light of the growing marketing literature regarding brand
extensions and brand alliances. It demonstrates that non-competitive uses of
a mark are unlikely to impact negatively the mark owner's reputation for
quality. Consumers, it turns out, are quite adept at compartmentalizing
their quality expectations by product category. At the same time, the
literature provides some empirical support for the claim that third-party uses
of a mark may interfere with a mark owner's ability to expand into new
product lines in the future.
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The lessons of the marketing literature raise significant questions about the
proper scope of trademark law. In particular, they suggest that arguments
about market preemption need to be engaged just as seriously in the
trademark context as they are in the patent and copyright contexts.
Recognizing interference with a mark owner's ability to expand as a
cognizable harm would be a substantial conceptual shift in trademark
theory, as market pre-emption does not depend on consumer confusion. If we
are not prepared to recognize the market preemption arguments as
justification for trademark rights, then consumer interests ought to take on a
much greater relative role in shaping the scope of those rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern scholarship takes a decidedly negative view of the scope of
trademark protection. Commentators decry recently developed confusion
doctrines like initial interest confusion, which they regard as evidence that
trademark law no longer works for the benefit of consumers.' Whole
conferences convene to address dilution, 2 the innovation many contend
most clearly crystallizes trademark law's over-expansion. And scholars
frequently criticize trademark law for its deleterious impact on free speech,
focusing most frequently on the outer edges of trademark law.
3
Whatever the merits of these criticisms-and many of them do have
merit-their focus on dilution and other modern doctrines is hugely
1. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HoUs. L. REv. 777, 781 (2004) (arguing that while the "initial interest confusion"
doctrine originally referred to consumer confusion that occurred before the sale, it has
changed into a stand-alone doctrine that does not resemble a traditional likelihood of
confusion claim); Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDoZO L. REv. 105, 108 (2005) (arguing that the "initial interest
confusion" doctrine is anti-competitive and "short-changes consumers"); see also Glynn S.
Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 371 (1999) (arguing that the recent shift in
trademark law has changed the question asked from one of probable confusion as to the source
of a product to possible confusion over the connection between the senior mark owner and the
allegedly infringing use).
2. Santa Clara Law, Trademark Dilution Symposium, http://www.scu.edu/law/
tmdilution/articles-and-presentations.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009); see also Sonia Katyal et al.,
Panel II: Trademark Dilution Revision Act Implications, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1093, 1103 (2006) (discussing how deleterious the elimination of the noncommercial-use
exception of trademark law would be); Michigan Law Review First Impressions, Online
Symposium on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, http://www.michiganlawreview.
org/articles/tag/Trademark+Dilution (last visited Nov. 10, 2009) (offering a forum for
discussing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006).
3. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams Itself to Be American: Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 523, 535-36 (1997) (arguing that expansive trademark decisions "protect the property
rights of the trademark owner over individual rights of free expression by failing to balance the
constitutionally protected rights in property with the constitutionally protected right of
freedom to individual expression .... instead, giv[ing] property rights precedence over First
Amendment right") (footnotes omitted); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 397-98 (1990)
(arguing that, while "the Constitution supplies a normative principle favoring public access to
the tools of expression, the body of law that has developed under the first amendment provides
a surprisingly uncongenial framework for analysis"); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark
Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REv. 49, 51-52 (2008) (arguing that, while courts frequently reach the fight
results in speech-related cases, trademark law's fair use doctrines are too uncertain and lead to
lengthy and costly litigation, ultimately chilling speech); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 417 (2008) ("Courts should be wary
about labeling all infringing commercial uses of trademarks 'misleading,' as this could suppress
or chill nonmisleading commercial speech.").
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disproportionate to the practical significance of those doctrines. 4 More
importantly, all of the criticism of these marginally significant doctrines
obscures overwhelming acceptance of the most important determinant of
the scope of trademark protection-the modern likelihood of confusion
standard. As Robert Bone stated succinctly, "No one doubts [that the]
central function of protecting trademarks [is to] benefit[] consumers by
preventing deceptive and confusing uses of source-identifying marks."
5
Bone is certainly right that few have questioned this "central function."
But easy acceptance of the harmfulness of confusion is actually a problem
because it operates at too high a level of generality, masking important
differences among the types of relationships about which consumers might
be confused. In fact, I argue that modern trademark law's excesses are
primarily the results of courts' failure to differentiate among those different
relationships. Mark owners are able to characterize almost every conceivable
use of their trademarks in consumer confusion terms, and because courts
have simply equated confusion with harm, they have lacked the tools to
resist novel confusion claims.
In order to begin the task of identifying meaningful conceptual limits
on the scope of trademark protection, this Article disaggregates consumer
confusion and focuses on the alleged harms to producers from confusion
regarding the source of non-competing goods. In particular, it evaluates
common arguments about the consequences of this type of confusion for
mark owners-arguments which sound in empirical terms but which have
4. Indeed, recent empirical work confirms that dilution claims rarely affect outcomes in
practice, at least in decided cases. See Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution
Law: Evidence from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450 (2008) (noting that empirical analysis of dilution cases
in the first year following the enactment of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
demonstrates that "antidilution law continues to have no appreciable effect on the outcomes of
federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing from those outcomes"); Clarisa Long, Dilution,
106 COLUM. L. REv. 1029, 1031 (2006) (concluding that, as of 2006, federal judicial
enforcement of dilution was not robust and eroding over time).
5. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2100
(2004) (noting that this standard account fails to explain some recent trademark law doctrines,
but nevertheless subscribing to the central function); see also Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 722 (2004) ("Confusion among consumers is the grave iniquity
against which trademark laws and jurisprudence are intended to guard."); Christopher
Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 338-39
("[P]laintiffs [in trademark cases] are required to introduce evidence that consumers actually
are confused when presented with a senior mark and a similar junior mark-i.e., direct evidence
of the kind of harm that the trademark law seeks to prevent." (emphasis added)). It is not clear
whether Sprigman meant to imply that trademark plaintiffs are required to produce evidence
of actual, as opposed to likely, confusion, but any such implication is incorrect. Every circuit, to
my knowledge, has made clear that evidence of actual confusion, though probative, is not
required. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23:12 (4th ed. 2007) ("Proof of actual confusion is not necessary....").
95 IOWA LA WREVIEW
never been empirically supported-against a growing body of marketing
literature dealing with brand extensions and brand alliances.
There are two parts to this framing, both of which deserve some
explanation. First, is the focus on cases in which the defendant's goods do
not compete with the plaintiff's. Here I mean to differentiate between a
claim by Nike, Inc. against another company selling NIKE shoes and a claim
against a company using the NIKE mark for other goods or services, and to
focus on the latter. 6 This subset of trademark infringement cases merits
specific attention because the harm to producers from confusion about the
source of competing goods is relatively clear: a competing NIKE shoe
company could use consumer confusion to divert customers who otherwise
would have bought shoes from Nike, Inc. 7 But since non-competitive uses do
not pose the same risk of trade diversion, trademark protection against
those uses requires a different justification. Courts' accommodation of
claims against such non-competitive uses therefore reflected not simply a
modest expansion of trademark law but a significant conceptual shift. Such
an important and radical change deserves closer scrutiny than it has
received, particularly because this conceptual change is responsible for most
of the competitive and speech costs of modern trademark protection.
8
Second, is the focus on producer-based justifications for claims against
non-competing goods rather than the more conventional consumer-interest
justifications. 9 I focus on producer interests because that was trademark
6. Non-competing goods could span a wide spectrum, ranging from closely related
products like athletic clothing to wholly unrelated services like selling securities. Nike, Inc. v.
Nike Securities, L.P., No. 97 C 0008, 2000 WIL 336524 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000) (denying Nike
Securities' motion for summary judgment on Nike, Inc.'s trademark infringement and unfair
competition claims).
7. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1839, 1841 (2007) (arguing that traditional trademark law focused narrowly on producers'
interests in preventing trade diversion).
8. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 18-20, on file with the Iowa Law Review) (arguing that the
majority of extreme trademark infringement cases involve claims of "sponsorship or affiliation"
confusion, which exist to accommodate claims against non-competitors).
9. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523,
525-27 (1988) (suggesting that trademarks primarily exist to enhance consumer decisions and
create incentives for firms to produce desirable products); William N. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988) (arguing that
trademark law is best understood as "trying to promote economic efficiency"); Mark A. Lemley,
The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695-96 (1999)
(stating that the single purpose of trademark law is "to enable the public to identify easily a
particular product from a particular source"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999) (describing why ownership attached to the consumer). Lunney
stated:
Ownership was assigned to the person who adopted the mark for her trade, not
because she had created it or its favorable associations, but because such person
was conveniently placed and strongly motivated to vindicate the broader public
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law's traditional orientation-nineteenth-century trademark law focused on
producers' interests in preventing trade diversionl°-and because the case
for expanding trademark protection to non-competing goods was based
almost entirely on claims about harms to mark owners. 
11
But this focus on producer interests is not intended to deny the
influence of the consumer-interest narrative in shaping modern trademark
law. Nor is it intended to deny that, in many cases, consumer and producer
interests overlap. Instead, by highlighting the producer-based arguments, I
hope to illustrate how commentators' singular focus on consumer search
costs fails to capture the complex relationship between the consumer-
oriented rhetoric and producer-oriented doctrinal structure that has
developed in the last half century. Courts in the mid- to late-twentieth
century reasonably understood trademark doctrine as producer-oriented,
and they shaped doctrine explicitly in response to producer-oriented
arguments. 12 As time went on, however, the consumer interest narrative
gained traction, and courts and commentators increasingly layered
consumer search cost rhetoric on top of the producer-oriented doctrine.
This layering enabled even further trademark expansion, as mark owners
successfully mixed producer- and consumer-based arguments in support of
their newest claims, often taking one from column A and two from column
B, and avoiding rigorous scrutiny of any of the arguments.
interest in a mark's ability to identify accurately the source of the goods to which it
was attached.
Id. See also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 778 (arguing that the historical normative goal of
trademark law is to foster the flow of information in markets, thereby reducing search costs for
consumers); Long, supra note 4, at 1033-34 (contrasting dilution protection with traditional
trademark protection and arguing that the former is producer-centered while the latter is
consumer-centered).
10. See generally McKenna, supra note 7 (arguing that traditional trademark law focused
narrowly on producers' interests in preventing trade diversion).
11. See infra Part III.A (articulating the standard arguments in favor of protection in the
context of non-competing goods). Though these arguments embraced a radically more
expansive view of the relevant interests, the focus on producer interests was consistent with
trademark law's traditional orientation.
12. At a minimum, a mark owner must have some legitimate claim of harm to have
standing to bring a claim. Under modern standing doctrine, it is not enough that the producer
might be able to vindicate consumer interests. Instead, the "irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing" requires: (1) that the plaintiff has suffered an "'injury in fact'-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is ... concrete and particularized" (meaning the
injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way) and "'actual or imminent, not
"conjectural" or "hypothetical;"'" (2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be 'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court;'" and (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that
the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted). Moreover, "the 'injury in fact' test requires more than
an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured." Id. at 563.
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This Article separates out the producer-based arguments analytically so
that those arguments can be evaluated on their own merits. In particular, it
evaluates the assumptions underlying the producer-harm arguments in light
of the available evidence from marketing literature regarding brand
extensions and alliances. This literature focuses on the effects of certain
branding strategies, particularly uses of known brands for new products and
joint efforts to produce products or offer services. Because these studies
make explicit that the extension or alliance products come from the senior
mark owner, they offer valuable insight into the consequences to mark
owners even ifa particular use is likely to cause confusion.
The marketing literature paints a complex and sometimes contradictory
picture of consumer evaluation of brand uses. On the whole, however, one
thing is clear: no presumption of harm from uses of a mark for non-
competing goods is warranted. Indeed the only sense in which one could
confidently conclude that mark owners are likely to be "harmed" by uses for
non-competing goods is that the later uses may interfere with the mark
owner's ability to expand into new markets. In other words, the literature
suggests that, from a producer's perspective, trademark protection against
non-competing goods is analogous to a derivative work right: it serves
primarily to protect mark owners' ability to use their marks in ancillary
markets, not because non-competitive uses cause mark owners harm, but
because of a sense that those ancillary markets rightfully belong to the
senior mark owner. 13
Market preemption arguments along these lines have long been offered
in support of trademark rights against non-competing goods. But because
they have generally been articulated as additional support for other primary
justifications that focused on quality attribution, and because most modern
commentators evaluate trademark law from a consumer search cost
perspective, trademark theorists have not been forced to confront squarely
the types of incentive-based arguments typically associated with copyright
generally, and the derivative work right specifically.14 This paper suggests
13. I mean to analogize here to the exclusive right to prepare derivative works in
copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006) ("Subject to section 107 through 122, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive right[] ... (2) to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work."). The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted." Id. § 101.
14. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that a
copyright is "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision
of a special reward"). Most scholars suggest the derivative work right is justifiable as an
application of this utilitarian principle. According to Paul Goldstein, for example, the derivative
work right "enables prospective copyright owners to proportion their investment in a work's
expression to the returns expected not only from the market in which the copyrighted work is
first published, but from other, derivative markets as well." Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
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that, given the lack of strong empirical support for quality feedback
arguments, market preemption and free-riding arguments need to be taken
seriously if producer-based arguments are going to continue to influence the
scope of trademark protection. 
15
If the market preemption and free-riding arguments are not persuasive,
then consumer-based arguments ought to take on much greater relative
significance with respect to claims involving non-competing goods. Focusing
on consumer interests would not necessarily entail a rejection of all of
trademark law's modem expansion, but it would require courts to tailor the
scope of trademark rights to legitimate consumer interests. Consumers have
an interest, for example, in being able to rely on information about who is
responsible for the quality of the goods or services with which a mark is
used. Because some uses of a mark for non-competing goods convey this sort
of quality information, claims against non-competitive uses are warranted,
even if mark owners are not significantly harmed, when the contested use
creates confusion about responsibility for quality. 16 Use of a mark that does
not suggest control over quality, on the other hand, does not implicate the
same consumer interests and therefore should be rejected unless a plaintiff
can show the use causes some other form of confusion that materially
impacts consumer purchasing decisions. 17
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
evolution of trademark law's likelihood of confusion standard from its
traditional focus on parties in close competitive proximity to its expansion to
accommodate claims against non-competing goods. Part III presents the
standard arguments advanced in favor of trademark protection in cases of
non-competing goods and attempts to isolate the behavioral assumptions
underlying those arguments. Part IV offers background on the brand
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 216 (1983); see also PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2004) (repeating the analysis). On this theory, the
derivative right may increase incentive to create a new work, increase the incentive for owners
to invest in new uses of the work, or both. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 353-57 (1989) (arguing that derivative rights
increase the incentive to engage in creative activities, encourage earlier publication of an
original work by making it unnecessary to withhold the publication in order to gain a lead time
in derivative markets, and reduce transactional costs by concentrating the control over
derivative works on the copyright owner). There are some alternative accounts of the derivative
right. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright's Derivative Right and Related Doctrines,
90 MINN. L. REv. 317, 322 (2005) (arguing the derivative right "is best understood not solely as
a means of furthering the incentive to create works, but more significantly as a means of
providing an author control over the release of adaptations and limiting the production of
adaptations that would be close substitutes for one another" and thereby reducing
redundancy).
15. It is worth noting that giving serious weight to market preemption and free-riding
arguments may well lead to fundamental changes in trademark law's doctrinal structure, as
market allocation decisions need not be determined by consumer confusion.
16. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8 (manuscript at 49).
17. Id.
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extension and brand alliance literature, and Part V evaluates the behavioral
assumptions in light of this. Part VI draws together some of the lessons of
the marketing literature and attempts to focus courts' attention in non-
competing goods cases on representations of responsibility for quality,
setting the stage for further elaboration of the scope of protection under
such an approach.
II. FRAMING THE MODERN LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION STANDARD
A. TRADITIONAL TRADEMARK LAw's NARRowFocus'
8
Trademark law traditionally sought to prevent illegitimate diversion of a
plaintiff's trade. 19 The Supreme Court articulated this purpose particularly
clearly in Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark20 :
[I]n all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are
invaded, it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists
in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor as those of another,
and that it is only when this false representation is directly or
indirectly made that the party who appeals to the court of equity
can have relief. This is the doctrine of all the authorities.
21
Importantly, courts understood trade diversion to be the relevant harm
whether the claim at issue was formally considered one for trademark
infringement or for unfair competition. As a result, commentators like
James Love Hopkins could describe unfair competition in the same
language courts used to describe the wrong of trademark infringement:
"[u]nfair competition consists in passing off one's goods as the goods of
another, or in otherwise securing patronage that should go to another, by false
representations that lead the patron to believe that he is patronizing
another person."22 Indeed, as Hopkins recognized, "The principles involved
in trademark cases and tradename cases [were] substantially identical.
'23
This protection against trade diversion was intended primarily to
vindicate producers' property rights rather than consumers' interests, even
though benefits to consumers were welcome byproducts. As one court said,
18. This section is adapted from McKenna, supra note 7.
19. See id. (explaining that English common-law courts and courts of equity worked to
remedy the harm improper diversion of trade caused a producer).
20. Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871).
21. Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).
22. JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAIMES AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1905) (emphasis added).
23. Id. § 3, at 9; see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916)
("Th[e] essential element is the same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition
unaccompanied with trade-mark infringement."); Marsh v. Billings, 61 Mass. (1 Cush.) 322, 330
(1851) (referring to the close conceptual relationship between trademark infringement and
unfair competition).
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"The private action [was] given, not for the benefit of the public, although
that may [have been] its incidental effect, but because of the invasion by
defendant of that which [was] the exclusive property of complainant."
24
Courts "interfere[d] solely for the purpose of protecting the owner of a
trade or business from a fraudulent invasion of that business by somebody
else" not "to prevent the world outside from being misled into anything."2
5
The property rights courts protected in these cases derived from the
natural rights theory that predominated in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In this tradition, property rights were intended to preserve for
individuals a zone of free action and the ability to reap the benefits of their
own labor or industry. 26 At the same time, courts recognized that protecting
property rights often conflicted with others' ability to labor productively,
and they therefore limited property rights to the extent necessary to respect
"the like rights of others." 27 In the trademark context, courts frequently
noted that, by protecting trademark rights, they were not interfering with
legitimate competition but only dishonest attempts to divert trade. As the
court said in Taylor v. Carpenter,28 trademark protection:
[D]oes not at all trench upon the rights of others, by a course of
conduct equally deserving and praiseworthy, to enter the lists of
competition, and bear off the palm. But it will not allow them by
falsehood, fraud, and forgery, to filch from another his good name,
and share it in common with him, or destroy or impair it.
29
24. Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281,284 (6th Cir. 1900).
25. Levy v. Walker, (1878) 10 A.C. 436, 448 (Ch.D.).
26. This notion of labor giving rise to property is most often associated with John Locke.
JOHN LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 47 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690) (-[E]very one ha[s] a Right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and
had a Property in all that he could affect with his Labour: all that his Industry could extend to,
to alter from the State Nature had put it in, was his."). Locke argued that God gave the world
"to the use of the Industrious and Rational," and that one acquires property by mixing his labor
with the common. Id. § 28, at 288-89, § 34, at 291. Thus, the proper object of the law is to
promote "the honest industry of Mankind." Id. § 42, at 298.
27. McKenna, supra note 7, at 1876-80; see also Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and
Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1556 (2003). Claeys suggests that:
If one could ask nineteenth-century jurists to reduce the natural-right approach to
a slogan, they might say that the object of all property regulation is to secure to
every owner an "equal share of freedom of action" over her own property. On this
understanding, every owner is entitled to some zone of non-interference in which
to use her possessions industriously, productively, and consistent with the health,
safety, property, and moral needs of her neighbors.
Id.
28. Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sand. Ch. 603 (N.Y. Ch. 1846).
29. Id. at 617. The U.S. Supreme Court similarly stated:
Rival manufacturers may lawfully compete for the patronage of the public in the
quality and price of their goods, in the beauty and tastefulness of their enclosing
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Courts did not, under this traditional view, protect trademarks for their
own sake. Their goal was instead to secure to a producer the benefits of
customer patronage it had earned, and courts therefore enforced a party's
trademark rights only when the defendant's use was likely to divert
customers who otherwise would have gone to the mark owner. Moreover,
mindful of the need to allow robust competition and productive labor by all
individuals, courts targeted only diversion achieved through deceptive
means. This construct gave mark owners fairly limited rights to use a mark in
a particular field of trade-both in the geographical sense and in terms of
product markets. Absent direct competition between the parties, a plaintiff
could not make a persuasive case that the defendant's use of a mark would
divert customers who otherwise would have gone to the plaintiff.
Courts developed this traditional framework at a time when producers
offered relatively few products in limited geographic areas, and when
advertising was quite limited by modern standards. 30 Trademark law's
narrow scope made sense in these market conditions, as consumers
unaccustomed to brand diversification were not likely to attach any
significance to the use of similar marks in unrelated markets. It was, in other
words, reasonable to assume that consumers categorized marks in terms of
particular products or services because brands rarely transcended product or
service categories.
The commercial landscape changed rapidly in the early twentieth
century as producers began serving much wider geographic and product
markets.3 1 Courts that recognized this changing commercial reality
undoubtedly felt pressure to expand the range of uses against which
trademark law would respond. Most significantly, mark owners wanted
broader trademark rights that would allow them to prevent certain non-
competitive uses. But since confusion cannot lead to trade diversion when
the parties offer different goods or services, extending protection to non-
competitive uses required fairly radical rethinking of trademark law's
purposes.
packages, in the extent of their advertising, and in the employment of agents, but
they have no right, by imitative devices, to beguile the public into buying their
wares under the impression they are buying those of their rivals.
Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893); see also Hilton v. Hilton, 104 A. 375, 376
(N.J. 1918) (quoting Vice Chancellor Wood's definition of goodwill in Churton v. Douglas,
(1859) 70 Eng. Rep. 385, 385 (Ch.), as including every affirmative advantage acquired by a firm
in carrying on its business, but not the negative advantage of competitors refraining from
carrying on their business).
30. See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill Trademark Law,
86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 575-79 (2006) (discussing how the growth of national markets and the rise
of national advertising changed trademark law).
31. Id.
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B. A NEW CONCEPTION OF HARM
1. Schechter's Approach
Frank Schechter understood as well as anyone that traditional
trademark principles could not accommodate the new economic reality of
the twentieth century.3 2 From Schechter's perspective, trademarks no longer
functioned simply as indicators of source; indeed, consumers frequently did
not know or care about the ultimate producer of a product. 33 Trademarks
instead functioned primarily to sell the goods to which they were attached.
34
Schechter focused particularly on marks that were "added to rather than
withdrawn from the human vocabulary by their owners, and [which] ha[d],
from the very beginning, been associated in the public mind with a
particular product. ' 35 KODAK, for example, was a made-up term added to
the vocabulary by the Eastman Kodak Company, and from the very
beginning KODAK was associated with cameras. BLUE RIBBON, on the
other hand, was widely used for many different products and therefore
lacked any distinctiveness. 36
Distinctive marks like KODAK had particular value, according to
Schechter, because they had a unique "identity and hold upon the public
mind" attributable to the marks' distinctiveness from other marks. 37 "The
more distinctive or unique the mark," he argued, "the deeper is its impress
upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection
against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection
with which it has been used."3 8 The real injury in cases involving non-
32. See generally Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L.
REv. 813 (1927) (advocating that trademark law reflect twentieth-century economics).
33. Id. at 814 (noting that, because of changes in production and distribution practices,
"the source or origin of the goods bearing a well known trademark [was] seldom known to the
consumer").
34. Id. at 819 ("The mark actually sells the goods.").
35. Id. at 829.
36. Id. at 829-30. Some of Schechter's examples of particularly distinctive marks were not
really "added to ... the human vocabulary by their owners." Id. ROLLS-ROYCE, for example,
was actually comprised of surnames. See Rolls-Royce: History, http://www.rolls-royce.com/north
america/history/default.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2009) (describing the agreement between
Henry Royce and Charles Rolls by which "Royce Limited would manufacture a range of cars to
be sold exclusively by CS Rolls & Co." under the name Rolls-Royce). Others, like BLUE
GOOSE, had ordinary English meanings. See Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, Snow Goose,
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9068392/snow-goose (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) ("The
blue goose, with bluish gray body plumage, white head and neck and, sometimes, white breast
and belly, was long separated from C. caertlescens but is now recognized as a dark-coloured
phase of the lesser snow goose."). But Schechter's point was less about whether these terms
were "added to the language" than about the fact that consumers associated them only with
particular products or services.
37. Schechter, supra note 32, at 825.
38. Id.
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competing goods, Schechter suggested, was "the gradual whittling away or
dispersion of [this] identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or
name by its use upon non-competing goods. ' 39
Schechter's approach was radical in that it did not conceive of
trademarks primarily in terms of source indication. Rather than focusing on
a trademark as a referent linking a product and its source, Schechter was
concerned about the associations between certain marks and the products
with which they were used. 4 Schechter was concerned, for example, that use
of KODAK for "bathtubs and cakes" would destroy the "arresting
uniqueness" of the KODAK mark, and "hence its selling power." 41
Importantly, according to Schechter, such uses would cost KODAK its selling
power whether or not consumers were confused about the source of
KODAK bathtubs or cakes. It followed for Schechter then that liability ought
not depend on evidence of source confusion, but should instead be imposed
whenever a third party used a mark that was sufficiently similar to the
distinctive mark. 42 Of course, just as courts and commentators have done
with respect to the harms they claim result from confusion in the context of
non-competing goods, Schechter intuited the harm he described. There was
no empirical evidence that KODAK was less effective as a mark for cameras if
another company sold KODAK bathtubs or cakes.
2. Expanding "Source" Confusion
Most of Schechter's contemporaries, even those who saw value in
Schechter's work, took the more pragmatic approach of encouraging courts
to expand the scope of infringement through broader construction of
source confusion. 43 Courts traditionally focused on confusion regarding
39. Id.
40. See Sara Stadler, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REv. 731, 795-96
(2003) (describing Schechter's focus on associations between marks and products).
41. Schechter, supra note 32, at 830. Schechter also suggested that:
[A]part from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use on other goods
... once a mark has come to indicate to the public a constant and uniform source
of satisfaction, its owner should be allowed the broadest scope possible for "the
natural expansion of his trade" to other lines or fields of enterprise.
Id. at 823.
42. See Stadler, supra note 40, at 755. As Stadler notes:
Schechter had defined a new linkage for trademark law: one between a unique,
singular trademark and the particular product on which it appeared. Source, the
old preoccupation of trademark law, no longer was part of the equation--except,
of course, to indicate the party who would reap the benefits of uniqueness.
Id. (footnote omitted).
43. See, e.g., Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases
of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 203 (1927) (advocating for broad construction of
the word "related" in the context of the "related goods" inquiry).
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source of origin because that type of confusion led to trade diversion, which
was the harm courts intended to prevent.44 And those courts interpreted
"source of origin" quite literally. Operating in a time when consumers were
unlikely to believe that unrelated goods came from the same source, a
liability standard that required evidence of confusion as to source of origin
was essentially equivalent to asking whether confusion would result in trade
diversion.
But the tight fit between the requirement of source confusion and the
focus on trade diversion depended critically on the assumption that
consumers would not think unrelated goods came from the same source.
The assumption became increasingly problematic as commercial
relationships grew more complex in the early twentieth century. Consumers
were becoming accustomed to seeing a wider variety of goods from any
particular source, just as they were beginning to understand that companies
did not always themselves produce the products that bore their marks. In
this emerging marketplace, confusion about actual source was no longer a
perfect proxy for trade diversion.
Divergence between the confusion standard and the trade diversion
theory provided an opportunity for courts that were no longer sure that
trade diversion was trademark law's only legitimate concern. By continuing
to focus on confusion as to source, courts could act as though they were
breaking no new ground even as they were finding infringement in cases
where there was no risk of trade diversion. In Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney
& Co.,45 for example, Aunt Jemima alleged that Rigney's use of AUNT
JEMIMA for flour infringed AuntJemima's rights in the mark, which it had
used for syrup. 46 Aunt Jemima should have lost this case according to
traditional trademark principles-the defendant was not diverting
customers who were trying to purchase syrup. Indeed, the court
acknowledged that "no one wanting syrup could possibly be made to take
flour." 4 7 Nevertheless, the court found infringement because, in its view, the
products were "so related as to fall within the mischief which equity should
prevent."
48
Similarly, in Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson,49 the court refused to allow
registration of YALE for flashlights and batteries in light of the plaintiff's
prior use of the YALE mark for locks. The court acknowledged that the
decision "[did] some violence" to the language of the Trademark Act of
44. Coats v. Holbrook, 7 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 645, 653 (N.Y. Ch. 1845) (noting trademark law's
purpose of preventing a defendant from "attract[ing] to himself the patronage that without
such deceptive use of such names... would have inured to the benefit of [the plaintiff]").
45. Auntiemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1917).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 409.
48. Id. at 409-10.
49. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
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1905, under which only use of a mark on goods "of the 'same descriptive
properties"' as those of the mark owner could infringe. 50 But, turning the
traditional rule on its head, the court claimed "it ha[d] come to be
recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so foreign to the owner's as to
insure against any identification of the two, it is unlawful."
51
The defendants in both Aunt Jemima and Yale Electric Corp., used marks
that were identical to the plaintiffs' for goods that were fairly closely related.
Thus, consumers who encountered those defendants' goods might actually
have believed the plaintiffs were the sources of the goods, even if the
plaintiffs did not in fact sell those goods. Consumers might, for example,
have actually believed that AuntJemima sold both flour and syrup, given the
complementary nature of those products. Consumers who believed that, of
course, still would not have been deceived into buying one when they
intended to buy the other. But as a purely doctrinal matter, a court could
plausibly conclude that the junior user of the AUNT JEMIMA mark
confused at least some consumers about the "source of origin" of the its
products.
Advocates for broader protection, however, were not content for courts
to find infringement only when consumers might actually have believed that
the mark owner was the source of the defendant's non-competing goods.
For one thing, while consumers surely were becoming more accustomed to
brand diversification, at that time they still would not frequently have
assumed that unrelated products came from the same source simply because
they bore the same mark. Some commentators dealt with that inconvenience
simply by assuming it away, suggesting consumers were becoming so
accustomed to seeing companies offer a wide variety of goods they would
always believe goods bearing a recognized mark were made by the same
company, even when those goods were quite remote.
5 2
50. Id. at 974 (citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Lukens, supra note 43, at 204. According to Lukens:
As commercial organization becomes more complex, it is becoming more usual for
a corporation to manufacture or sell a wide variety of products. Many companies
produce articles that have no similarity, nor any relationship beyond the fact that
they are so produced. Such a concern frequently applies the same trade-name to
all its products in the hope that the good-will of the older products will attach to
the newer ones. The public has become so accustomed to the idea of dissimilar articles being
produced by the same company that it is hardly surprised at any combination whatever.
Id. (emphasis added); see also George W. Goble, Where and What a Trade-Mark Protects, 22 U. ILL.
L. REV. 379, 388 (1927) (arguing against the requirement that the defendant's goods be of the
"same class" as the plaintiffs and stating, "It seems reasonable to suppose that ordinarily
identity of trade name or mark in itself would sufficiently relate them to cause mental
association as to the manufacture or origin of the goods, dissimilar and unrelated though the
goods may otherwise be ....").
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Most courts were not prepared to be that radical. They were, however,
prepared to believe that use of a known mark for unrelated goods might
suggest to consumers some sort of relationship between the producers of
unrelated goods. Use of the same mark might, for example, suggest that the
mark owner sponsored or stood behind the quality of the junior user's
goods. 53 By redefining the "source" of a product to include related or
affiliated parties, courts could capture confusion about these types of
relationships while continuing to insist that trademark infringement
required confusion as to source.
54
Importantly, however, even though they were protecting a much
broader interest in these cases, courts continued to focus on the harm to
producers from confusion about sponsorship or affiliation. According to the
court in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, for example,
[T]he wrong of the defendant [in selling girdles under the name
"Miss Seventeen"] consisted in [sic] imposing upon the plaintiff
[publisher of Seventeen magazine] a risk that the defendant's
goods would be associated by the public with the plaintiff, and it
can make no difference whether that association is based upon
attributing defendant's goods to plaintiff or to a sponsorship by the
latter when it has been determined that plaintiff had a right to
protection of its trade name.
55
In other words, courts continued to focus on harm to mark owners from the
defendants' uses; they just were willing to accept as actionable a wider range
of potential harms.
3. Accommodating Licensing Arrangements
Courts' interest in accommodating the emerging practice of licensing
production of trademarked products also pushed them to expand the
concept of source to capture a broader set of commercial relationships.
Licensing posed serious conceptual problems in traditional trademark law
because courts in that era viewed source literally. When a party who had
53. In Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924), for example, the court
found the defendant's use of "The Vogue Hat Company" to sell hats infringed Vogue's rights in
the Vogue mark for fashion magazines, and stated:
There is no reason to doubt that this course of conduct by the defendant
manufacturer and its retailers created a very common alternative impression-first,
that these hats were manufactured by the plaintiff; or, second, that, although some
knew that plaintiffwas not manufacturing, yet these hats were in some way vouched
for or sponsored or approved by the plaintiff.
Id. at 511.
54. Schechter described the process of expansion of unfair competition principles beyond
cases where diversion of trade was likely as "one of making exceptions rather than of frank
recognition of the true basis of trademark protection." Schechter, supra note 32, at 821.
55. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1948) (emphasis added).
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licensed production of products bearing its marks sought to enforce its
trademark rights, courts were faced with two parties, neither of which was
the actual source of the products at issue. It was difficult for courts in these
cases to see how a mark owner deserved relief when it arguably was engaging
in the same type of deception as the accused infringer. It was also difficult to
see how the defendant's use diverted consumers who otherwise would have
gone to the mark owner when the mark owner was not, in fact, the source of
the products. Hence, licensing traditionally was forbidden.
56
But courts in the early twentieth century increasingly saw licensed
production as genuine commercial practice. In order to distinguish
legitimate uses by affiliated companies from infringing uses by third parties,
courts gradually loosened the restrictions on licensing. They did so primarily
by redefining what it meant to be the source of a product: even when a mark
owner did not actually produce the products bearing its mark, courts began
to hold, it could still be considered the legal source of those products if it
exercised sufficient control over their quality.
57
Congress later codified this understanding of source in § 1055 of the
Lanham Act, which provides that use of a mark by "related companies"
inures to the benefit of the mark owner.58 A "related company" is one
"whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with respect to
the nature and quality of goods or services on or in connection with which
the mark is used."59 Thus, in modem terms, the legal source of product
products bearing a particular mark is the party that exercises control over
the quality of those products, even if that party does not actually produce
the products. In fact, the legal source might be related to the actual
producer only by contract.
The conceptions of source in these two contexts-licensing and
infringement-were intentionally symmetrical. It was no longer necessary
that a mark owner actually produce the goods bearing its mark in order to
be considered the legal source of those goods. Nor was it necessary in
proving infringement that a plaintiff demonstrate the defendant's use of a
mark was likely to cause confusion about the actual source of the
defendant's goods. Instead, the mark owner could argue that consumers
would assume that the defendant, like the mark owner's licensees, operated
under the mark owner's control. It was sufficient, in other words, that the
56. See McKenna, supra note 7, at 1893-95 (describing the traditional rule against
licensing and its theoretical justification).
57. See, e.g., Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v.J. S. Ivins' Son, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Pa.
1934) ("An article need not be actually manufactured by the owner of the trade-mark it being
enough that it is manufactured under his supervision and according to his directions thus
securing both the right of the owner and the right of the public." (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. State,
225 S.W. 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920))).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006).
59. Id. § 1127.
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defendant's use might cause confusion about whether the mark owner
sponsored or was affiliated with the defendant's use.
1II. JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED BY COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
Expansion of trademark protection to non-competing goods has been
so widely accepted that most modern justifications of trademark law do not
focus specifically on non-competing goods but instead justify trademark
protection by emphasizing the benefits of protecting trademark rights
generally.
Professor McCarthy, for example, emphasizes trademark law's role in
giving producers incentive to invest in quality:
A certain amount of image differentiation also helps consumers
select products of high quality and reliability and motivates
producers to maintain adequate quality standards. If there were no
brand names and trademarks, the consumer might never be sure
who made a product and would have difficulty rewarding through
repeat purchases manufacturers who achieve high quality or cater
to his or her special tastes .... The existence of branded goods
whose characteristics vary little from week to week makes it possible
to have convenient supermarkets and hence to realize the
efficiencies of supermarkets. 6°
William Landes and Richard Posner similarly argue that trademark rights
encourage mark owners to maintain consistent quality, whereas failure to
protect trademark rights would allow imitators who know they will not be
held responsible for the quality of their products to cut corners and
undermine the incentives for mark owners to maintain quality themselves.61
These arguments have long roots, 62 and the Supreme Court frequently
60. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:4 (quoting F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 378 (2d ed. 1980).
61. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 179 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) ("[A] firm with a valuable
trademark will be reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would suffer a capital loss
on its investment in the trademark .... [L]egal protection of trademarks encourages the
production of higher-quality products."); see also id. at 203 (arguing that imitators have
incentives to produce lower-quality goods). In fact, the junior user's incentive to free ride on
the senior user's mark by imitating the mark and cutting quality "will be greater the higher the
quality of the underlying good, adjusted for [the junior user's] costs of making the physical
good appear equivalent to [the senior user's]." Id.
62. Edward Rogers made essentially the same argument in 1949, when he wrote that
without trademarks, "[t] here could be no pride of workmanship, no credit for good quality, no
responsibility for bad." Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks,
14 LAw& CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175 (1949).
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parrots them in trademark cases.6 3 Yet those who offer these arguments
rarely explain how they apply with respect to non-competing goods.
Those few courts and commentators that focus on the more particular
issue of non-competing goods offer a series of related arguments in favor of
extending trademark protection to this context. These arguments have
several variations, but they can be boiled down to two types: (1) arguments
about the reputational consequences for mark owners if the new products
disappoint consumers; and (2) market foreclosure and free-riding
arguments. George Gobel's arguments, which he articulated in 1927, are
characteristic. 64 Focusing on a hypothetical case in which a plaintiff "handles
Virgin Cigars and the defendant brings forth Virgin Cigarettes," Goble
concluded that "smokers might easily suppose the maker of Virgin Cigars
was also the maker of Virgin Cigarettes. ' 65 In such a case, according to
Goble, the defendant would harm the plaintiff in two ways: "(1) If the
defendant's cigarettes are of inferior quality, the plaintiff's reputation as a
manufacturer of superior goods is likely to be impaired, and (2) the plaintiff
is prevented from extending into the business of manufacturing cigarettes, a
field into which he might naturally and readily go." 66
These arguments have changed very little over time, despite the fact
that they were originally based on untested assumptions about consumers'
behavior in the face of confusion. Notably, and in contrast to the
conventional understanding of trademark law as protection for consumers,
these arguments in favor of expanding the scope of trademark protection
focused entirely on producer interests. 67 Yet courts' increasing acceptance
of the consumer-oriented justification for trademark law may have affected
the arguments regarding non-competing goods in one important respect:
the producer-based arguments may not have received the scrutiny they
deserved because courts no longer believed evidence of producer harm was
required. Indeed, some prominent commentators specifically argued that
63. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) (stating that
"trademarks desirably promote competition and the maintenance of product quality"); see also
Publ'ns Int'l Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he seller will be able
to appropriate the benefits of making a product that consumers like, and so he will have an
incentive to make a good product.").
64. Goble, supra note 52, at 379.
65. Id. at 385.
66. Id.; see also Lukens, supra note 43, at 197 (explaining types of harm similar to those
explained by Goble).
67. It is true that consumer confusion is a predicate to these producer harms, and it
obviously is possible that consumers are harmed by their confusion in some of these cases as
well. The point here is not that there is no overlap between producer and consumer interests. It
is instead that advocates for broader protection did not base their arguments on consumer
interests, and consumer and producer interests are not obviously coterminous here. For an
argument regarding the scope of consumer interests, see generally Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 8.
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courts no longer needed evidence of producer harm to find infringement.
According to Gobel:
[I]t [was] possible that under the federal trade commission act,
sec. 5, it need not [have been] shown that the plaintiff suffered
harm as a result of the defendant's conduct to justify an injunction
against the defendant. That act provideid] "if it shall appear ...
that it would be of interest to the public," an order to cease and
desist from the practice of an "unfair method of competition" will
be proper.68
Whatever the reason for their acceptance, these arguments regarding
the harm of confusion in the context of non-competing goods satisfied
enough judges and commentators that expanding trademark protection
beyond cases of direct competition became relatively uncontroversial. But
these arguments need to be revisited because more-recent research casts
serious doubt on a number of the assumptions on which the arguments were
based.
A. REPUTATIONAL DILUTION
The first two arguments in favor of protection against non-competing
uses relate to the present consequences to the mark owner of confusion
about the source 69 of the junior user's goods. First is the claim that
confusion regarding the source of non-competitive goods can harm a mark
owner if the junior user's products are of poor quality. Second is the related
claim that, regardless of the present quality of the junior user's goods, mark
owners are harmed because they lose control over their reputation when
consumers are confused about the source of the junior user's non-
competing goods.
It is worth emphasizing that although modern courts and
commentators generally regard confusion as entirely distinct from the harm
caused by dilution, the arguments articulated here are really about dilution
of a brand in a more colloquial sense. These are not arguments about
imminent economic loss to a mark owner. They are instead arguments about
the ways third-party uses interfere with the meaning of a brand, and how
that interference might ultimately cause economic harm by depressing
demand for the mark owner's products or services. In other words, future
arguments about the harm caused by confusion in the context of non-
competing goods differ from arguments about the harm from dilution only
in terms of the components of a brand's meaning with which the use
68. Goble, supra note 52, at 391 n.41. To be fair, the cases Goble contemplated here were
actions by the FTC, not traditional trademark infringement actions by private actors.
Nevertheless, Goble made this suggestion in the course of arguing for expansion of the private
right to non-competing goods and gave no sense of a distinction between the two contexts.
69. Here I define "source" to include sponsorship or affiliation relationships.
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allegedly interferes. While dilution focuses on loss of distinctiveness or on
negative associations, confusion cases involving non-competing goods focus
on the impact of a third-party use on a brand's quality message. There is
irony here in that, while dilution has attracted a huge amount of negative
attention from scholars, sponsorship or affiliation confusion has been
largely unquestioned, even though it pursues harms that are more similar to
those addressed by dilution than those caused by confusion in the case of
competing goods.
1. Negative Feedback
According to one common justification of protection against use of a
mark on non-competing goods, confusion about the relationship between a
known senior user and a junior user or its products is harmful because the
quality of the junior user's products might diverge from that of the senior
user. Consumers who are disappointed with the junior user's products might
hold their negative experience against the senior user, with which they
associate the mark. More specifically, consumers who are disappointed in
the quality of the junior user's products might then question whether the
senior user really makes the quality products they had previously expected. 7
0
This will discourage consumers from patronizing the senior user in the
future because they will no longer be able to rely on the mark as an
indicator of quality. This is one sense in which a third-party use might
interfere with the meaning of senior user's mark-by introducing negative
quality associations.
But seeing the harm to mark owners this way presents a puzzle: if a
mark owner is harmed only when the quality of the junior user's products
diverges from its own, why do courts not require plaintiffs to demonstrate
the inferiority of the defendant's products or services? 71 One answer,
70. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 24:15 ("If, for example, the infringer's V-8 vitamin pills
make the purchaser's child sick, she may well carry over an unfavorable reaction to plaintiff's V-
8 vegetable juice.").
71. The quality of the defendant's goods or services typically is considered in the
likelihood of confusion analysis, but courts regularly note that plaintiffs are not required to
demonstrate the inferiority of the defendant's goods in order to prevail. See, e.g., Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) (suggesting in a
case of post-sale confusion that the high quality of the defendant's products might actually
"increase the likelihood of confusion as to source"); Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 698 F.2d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that "[clourts readily find
irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases because of the victim's inability to control
the nature and quality of the infringer's goods, not because the infringer's goods are necessarily
inferior," and that "[e]ven if the infringer's goods are of high quality, the victim has the right to
insist that its reputation not be imperiled by another's actions"(citation omitted)); Yale Elec.
Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) ("The disparity in quality between such
wares and anything the plaintiff makes no longer counts, if that be true. The defendant need
not permit another to attach to its good will the consequences of trade methods not its own.").
Indeed, according to McCarthy, "today, the overwhelming majority view is that it is not
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offered by Robert Bone in a recent article, has to do with enforcement
costs.
7 2 Bone argues that courts do not require mark owners to prove the
inferiority of the defendant's products because proving a quality difference
is likely to be difficult, making the administrative costs of doing so high.
Moreover, "the social costs of a false negative (that is, an erroneous failure to
find infringement) greatly exceed the social costs of a false positive (that is,
an erroneous infringement finding).
73
To be more precise, Bone argues that the rate of erroneous non-
infringement findings (RN) multiplied by the social cost of an error of this
type (SN) exceeds by more than the amount of administrative costs entailed
in a more precise system (AQ) the value of the rate of erroneous
infringement findings (RI) multiplied by the social cost of such errors (SI).
Represented mathematically, Bone assumes that, in the aggregate:
RN X SN> R x S +AQ
Bone defines "erroneous decisions" as those that impose liability in the
absence of quality differences or refuse to find liability when quality
differences exist.74 The administrative costs would be the costs of requiring
evidence that the defendant's goods are in fact inferior. This is, of course,
merely a conceptual representation as all of these variables are likely to be
difficult (perhaps even impossible) to quantify in any particular case.
But it is worth highlighting here the assumption on which this analysis
depends-the assumption that, as a general matter, mark owners will be
harmed if the junior user's products are inferior in quality and courts do not
intervene. Bone simply assumes away the possibility that mark owners would
not be harmed even if consumers are confused about the mark owner's
sponsorship or affiliation of the junior party's inferior goods. Again, to be
more precise, Bone assumes that the frequency with which a court finds
non-infringement despite the fact that consumers are likely to impute bad
quality to the mark owner (FN) multiplied by the social cost of finding non-
infringement when the harm is likely to result (CN), exceeds the product of
the cost of finding infringement when harm is unlikely to follow (C) and
the frequency of such an erroneous conclusion (F) by more than the
administrative costs of requiring mark owners to prove that such confusion
actually harms them in a particular case (An). Again, mathematically:
FN X CN > F, x C + AH
necessary for plaintiff to prove that the defendant's non-competing goods are of inferior
quality." 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 24:15.
72. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REv. 2099, 2150
(2004) (describing this phenomenon as courts focusing on "likelihoods and ignor[ing]
harms").
73. Id. at 2155.
74. Id.
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This assumption is more interesting because we can more readily
determine whether, and under what circumstances, harm is likely to follow
from confusion regarding the source of non-competing goods. In particular,
marketing literature can help us determine when consumers who are
confused about the source of the defendant's inferior products are likely to
hold their disappointment against the mark owner.
Bone's own analysis foreshadows some of the lessons of this literature,
which casts doubt on the general assumption that consumers will hold mark
owners responsible for the quality of non-competing goods just because they
believe there is a relationship between the two uses. Describing the
administrative costs of requiring evidence that the junior party's goods are
inferior, Bone notes that proving quality divergence is likely to be
particularly difficult "when the products do not compete, since the parties
can . . . dispute the appropriate quality baseline against which to evaluate
the defendant's product. ' 75 Put simply, Bone's concern is that fact-finders
will not know how to compare the quality of unrelated goods. Yet Bone fails
to recognize that consumers may have a similar problem: consumers may
not have any clear quality expectations for new products when those
products are different from the mark owner's. Even if they do have some
vague quality expectations, those expectations are likely provisional, and
deviations from them might easily be explained by the difference in goods.
In either case-if consumers have no particular quality expectations or if
they have tentative expectations that can be altered easily-consumers are
unlikely to hold any disappointment with the new products against the
senior mark owner.
2. Loss of Control
For some courts and commentators, the answer to Bone's puzzle-why
courts do not typically require evidence that the defendant's goods are of
inferior quality-is that the present quality of the defendant's goods is
irrelevant. Whether or not the defendant's goods put the plaintiffs
reputation at risk at any particular point in time, refusing to find
infringement when consumers are confused about a mark owner's
relationship with non-competitive goods would put the mark owner's
reputation in the junior user's hands.76
In Aunt Jemima, the court found the defendant's use of the AUNT
JEMIMA mark for flour infringed the plaintiffs rights in the mark for syrup,
even though "no one wanting syrup could possibly be made to take flour."
77
According to the court:
75. Id. at 2152.
76. See4 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 24:15 ("[E]ven if defendant's goods are not of inferior
quality today, who is to say what they may be like in the future?").
77. AuntJemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1917).
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Syrup and flour are both food products, and food products
commonly used together. Obviously the public, or a large part of it,
seeing this trade-mark on a syrup, would conclude that it was made
by the complainant. Perhaps they might not do so, if it were used
for flatirons. In this way the complainant's reputation is put in the hands
of the defendants. 
78
Judge Learned Hand similarly remarked in Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson79 :
[A producer's] mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the
goods which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another
uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies
within his own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower
does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation,
like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another
can use it only as a mask. 80
Modern cases strike the same note. In El Greco Leather Products Co. v. Shoe
World, Inc.,81 for example, the court wrote that:
One of the most valuable and important protections afforded by
the Lanham Act is the right to control the quality of the goods
manufactured and sold under the holder's trademark. For this
purpose the actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the
control of quality that a trademark holder is entitled to maintain.
82
Implicit in this argument is an assumption that the junior users'
products will at some point diverge in quality, at least in some significant
number of cases. Legal intervention is therefore warranted even if the risk of
divergent quality has not yet materialized. This assumption is justified,
according to some scholars, for the same reason it is justified in the context
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
80. Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
81. El Greco Leather Prod. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 395 (citations omitted); see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The trademark laws are designed not only to
prevent consumer confusion but also to protect 'the synonymous right of a trademark owner to
control his product's reputation."'); Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 277 F. Supp.
326, 335 (N.D. Ga. 1967) (discussing the repercussions of trademark infringement on the
trademark owner). The court held:
The defendant argues that it has an "untarnished reputation for fair dealing and
honesty" and that its products are "noted for their high quality," and on this basis
urges that its infringement cannot cause any real or meaningful injury. Granting
that the defendant has such a reputation, and that their products have such a
quality, the rule remains: "It is not to be disputed that the plaintiff is not required




of competing goods: because lack of enforcement against non-competitive
products would create bad incentives. If trademark rights did not extend to
non-competitive goods, a junior user of the mark could-and therefore
would-cut corners, knowing that consumers would blame the senior mark
owner for any resulting poor quality.
83
Whether mark owners' reputations really are vulnerable when they lose
control over the quality of the junior user's goods depends, however, not
only on the assumption that the junior user will make inferior products, but
also on the assumption that consumers would hold the mark owner
responsible for any deviation in quality. This argument therefore ultimately
depends on the same behavioral assumption that underlies the quality-
divergence argument. Yet, as it turns out, mark owners have not been
particularly consistent in their claims about the risk of lack of control. In the
infringement context, mark owners have argued that lack of control over the
quality of the defendants' goods is a great risk to them. At the same time,
putative mark owners have argued, at least in the merchandising context,
that their previous lack of control over third-party uses did not destroy
source significance as long as the others' quality remained relatively
consistent.
In University Bookstore v. University of Wisconsin, Madison,84 for example,
the record demonstrated that the University Bookstore and many others in
the Madison area had used the WISCONSIN BADGERS mark and Bucky
Badger logo for many years, and even long before the University itself made
any use of the marks.8 5 Such longstanding uncontrolled use by third parties
ordinarily would result in abandonment of rights in a mark 86 -assuming the
83. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985). The court
notes that:
The value of a trademark is in a sense a "hostage" of consumers; if the seller
disappoints the consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark. ... The
similar mark also dilutes the hostage value of the first, because the firm that
created the mark may lose business on account of the inferior products of its rival,
while the rival may not lose as much business as its own quality dictates because
customers mistakenly blame the first firm for the failings of the second.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 61, at 203 (arguing that junior
users that adopt marks similar to other earlier users for the purpose of confusing consumers are
"likely to produce a lower-quality product").
84. Univ. Bookstore v. Univ. of Wis., Madison, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994).
85. Id. at 1395 (noting, with respect to use of the "Bucky Badger" mascot on clothing, that
opposers were selling apparel imprinted with the mascot by the early 1950s and had continued
to do so along with many others, while the University did not begin marketing such clothing
until, at the earliest, sometime in 1983).
86. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 5, § 17:8 (noting that a mark can "become[] abandoned
to generic usage as a result of the trademark owner's failure to police the mark, so that
widespread usage by competitors leads to a generic usage among the relevant public, who see
many sellers using the same word or designation").
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mark owner ever had any rights.8 7 Yet the University of Wisconsin
successfully argued in University Bookstore that the longstanding uncontrolled
uses of the mark were best understood as impliedly licensed uses, and that
the University's failure to police those implied licensees was excusable
because "the quality of the apparel imprinted with [the logos] remained at
an acceptable level in virtually all instances."
88
In fact, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the "Board") has
ignored the quality-control requirement fairly routinely in abandonment
cases in which the purported licensee's products were of reasonable quality.
In Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Bros.,89 the Board refused to find abandonment
even when there was no evidence of quality control, claiming that "[e]ven if
[it] w[as] to assume that [the licensor] exercised no quality control over the
operations of [the licensee's] tavern . . . 'the inference of abandonment is
not drawn [where] satisfactory quality was maintained, and, hence, no
deception of purchasers occurred."' 90 And it is not just the Board that has
failed consistently to enforce the quality-control requirement. In Board of
Governors of University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine,9 1 the court found that
"many manufacturers used [plaintiff University of North Carolina's] marks
prior to the licensing program's institution" and made clear it was "dubious
of [the University's] contention that it had no actual knowledge of any
alleged unauthorized third-party use of its marks."92 Nevertheless, the court
refused to find the mark abandoned because, it believed, the mark had not
lost all significance as a source identifier despite the widespread,
uncontrolled use.
9 3
The point here is not that courts always ignore the quality-control
requirement-they do not 94-only that they sometimes do, and at mark
87. Because rights at common law accrue through use, it is not clear why the University
should have been regarded as having superior rights in use of the mark for merchandise. To
the extent use of the University's logo on merchandise is the type of use sufficient to trigger
trademark rights, the University Bookstore and others in the Madison area made use of the
mark long before the University. Nevertheless, the Board concluded that the Bookstore
acquired no rights through its use because it had only sold apparel and merchandise imprinted
with the logo and never used the logo as a mark. Univ. Bookstore, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1396. Yet it is
not at all clear why, if the Bookstore's use was not sufficient to trigger rights because it merely
sold merchandise bearing the logo, the University acquired rights when it made precisely the same
type of use.
88. Id. at 1396.
89. Brewski Beer Co. v. Brewski Bros., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
90. Id. at 1288.
91. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
92. Id. at171.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Barcamerica Int'l U.S.A. Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 597-98 (9th
Cir. 2002) (rejecting the licensor's argument that "because [the licensee] makes good wine, the
public is not deceived by [the licensee's] use of the [licensed] mark," on the ground that
"[w]hether [the licensee's] wine was objectively 'good' or 'bad' is simply irrelevant. What
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owners' behest. To put it differently, mark owners opportunistically argue
both sides of the issue, sometimes suggesting that lack of control is a great
risk and other times acting as though there is little risk. This should give us
some reason to question a general assumption that lack of control
necessarily puts mark owners at risk. And, as we will see, there are other
good reasons to doubt it as a general assumption, at least in the context of
non-competing goods.
B. PRODUCT-MARKET PREEMPTION
Another argument that courts sometimes have offered relates not to the
present harm of third-party uses but to potential benefits foreclosed by those
uses. According to this argument, a junior use of a mark for non-competitive
goods may preclude the senior user from entering into the junior user's
field. Thus, for example, even if another party's use of the EXXON mark for
cars did not directly affect Exxon Corp.-perhaps because consumers did
not hold Exxon Corp. responsible for the quality of EXXON cars-Exxon
Corp. still would be harmed because it would not be able to expand into the
car market under the EXXON mark.
During the time they were expanding trademark law beyond directly
competing goods, courts made this foreclosure argument with respect to
both new geographic and new product markets. The traditional geographic
and product market limitations were applications of the same general
principle: when a third-party use was geographically remote or was in
connection with different goods, the defendant's use was unlikely to divert
customers who otherwise would have gone to the mark owner. Arguments
for expanding protection to geographically remote areas and to non-
competitive markets thus focused on harms other than diversion that were
purportedly common to both situations. Specifically, advocates of expansion
claimed not only that a mark owner would be harmed if the remote user
made inferior articles, but also that later uses of the same mark would
foreclose market opportunities to the mark owner.
In Precision Tune, Inc. v. Tune-A-Car, Inc.,95 for example, the court
characterized the defendant's use of a confusingly similar mark in a
different geographic market as "depriv[ing] [the plaintiff] of an opportunity
to expand its market."96 As long as the defendant "continue[d] to employ
the deceptively similar marks and trade dress, [the mark owner] [could not]
attempt to open a franchise because it [could not] guarantee its franchisee's
exclusive use of the mark. '97 Likewise, in finding that the defendant's use of
matters is that [the mark owner] played no meaningful role in holding the wine to a standard
of quality--good, bad, or otherwise").
95. Precision Tune, Inc. v. Tune-A-Car, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1984).
96. Id. at 368.
97. Id.
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VERA for cosmetics and toiletries infringed the plaintiffs rights in the same
mark-which it acquired through use of the mark on women's scarves,
sportswear, and linens-the court in Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd.98
emphasized the plaintiff's interest in being able to enter a related field at
some future time.
99
These market preemption arguments are difficult to disentangle
entirely from pure free-riding arguments because the notion that a mark
owner is preempted by a junior user from entering another market operates
on a background assumption that the senior user has a superior right to
operate in that other market under "its" mark. Specifically, in the context of
the Exxon hypothetical above, this argument assumes that any value the




Though not frequently offered as a stand-alone justification for
expansive trademark protection, in many cases courts have been moved by
their perception that the defendant was free-riding on value created by the
senior user of the mark. Free-riding arguments generally do not stand on
their own because they do not depend on consumer confusion, which is
widely regarded as the touchstone of liability. Courts therefore tend to tack
free-riding arguments onto confusion-based arguments.
Nevertheless, courts' concern about free-riding is readily apparent. In
Aunt Jemima, the court claimed that, not only would confusion put the mark
owner's reputation in the hands of the defendant, but "[i]t [would] enable
them to get the benefit of the complainant's reputation and
advertisement."10 1
This sense that junior users of a mark are free-riding on another's
investment pervades modern trademark cases and frequently gives comfort
to courts accepting novel claims of infringement. In Boston Professional
Hockey, for example, the court found the conclusion "inescapable that,
98. Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps. Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 1172. The court identified two other relevant interests: the mark owner's interest
in "protecting the good reputation associated with his mark from the possibility of [it] being
tarnished by inferior merchandise of the junior user," and the "public's interest in not being
misled by confusingly similar marks." Id.
100. Schechter clearly accepted this proposition. See Schechter, supra note 32, at 823. He
states:
Quite apart from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use on other
goods .... once a mark has come to indicate to the public a constant and uniform
source of satisfaction, its owner should be allowed the broadest scope possible for
"the natural expansion of his trade" to other lines or fields of enterprise.
Id.
101. AuntJemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917).
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without plaintiffs' marks, defendant would not have a market for his
particular product among ice hockey fans desiring to purchase emblems
embroidered with the symbols of their favorite teams." 102 Such "inescapable"
conclusions abound in cases that press new boundaries regarding the scope
of a mark owner's rights. 1
03
Courts are not alone in this regard. Even Professor McCarthy, while
careful to note than an investment in goodwill is not enough by itself to
create trademark rights, argues that "[t]he creation of value in a trademark
requires 'the expenditure of great effort, skill and ability' and a competitor
should not be permitted to take a 'free ride' on the trademark owner's good
will and reputation." 1
04
D. SUMMARY OFJUSTIICATIONS FOR EXPANDED PROTECTION
These quality feedback, market preemption, and free-riding arguments
for extending trademark rights to non-comepting goods all make
assumptions about how consumers will react when they encounter goods
that bear a known mark but which differ from those with which the mark
had been associated. Yet we need not rely entirely on assumptions here. A
growing body of marketing literature focuses on consumer reaction to uses
of a mark in new contexts. The following sections describe the relevant
bodies of literature and evaluate the common justifications for expanded
trademark protection in light of the themes that emerge from that
literature.
IV. BACKGROUND ON MODERN MARKETING LITERATURE
A. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
Marketing literature focuses on the impact of various practices on
brands, which are conceptually broader than trademarks. Brands are
generally described in terms of their "brand attribute associations,"
informational nodes that contain the meaning of a brand for consumers and
are linked to the brand cue in memory. 105 Marketers use these associations
to differentiate, position, and extend brands by suggesting attributes or
102. Boston Prof'I Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011
(5th Cir. 1975).
103. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1981) ("To deny
Warner Bros. injunctive relief would be to enable Gay Toys 'to reap where [i]t has not sown.'"
(citation omitted)); Stork Rest. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356 (9th Cir. 1948) ("The value of the
designation is wholly adventitious, brought about by continued, expensive, and spectacular
advertising--such as the giving away of one thousand dollar bills. The conclusion is inescapable
that the appellees are seeking to capitalize on the publicity that the appellant has built around
the name.").
104. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:30.
105. David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 54 J.
MARKETING 27, 28 (1990).
[2009]
TESTING MODERN TRADEMARK LAW'S THEORY OF HARM
benefits of purchasing or using the specific brand. 106 Trademarks play an
important role for a brand because they often serve as the brand cues to
which the brand attribute associations are linked. But the brand is a
comprehensive concept that encompasses all of its representations and all
the associated meaning.
According to David Aaker and Kevin Lane Keller, marketers most
frequently use product attributes or characteristics to position a brand.
10 7
But a brand also can have associations with particular use situations, types of
product users, places, and/or product classes. 10 8 Collectively, the functional
and symbolic brand attribute associations comprise brand image, and brand
image appears to be largely product-category specific. 1 9 Brand image, in
other words, cannot readily be disentangled from the products or services
offered under the brand. Nevertheless, consumers do not always emphasize
the same elements of brand image for all brands in the same product
category. For example, ROLEX and TIMEX might have different brand
image dimensions because ROLEX is associated with prestige and therefore
might be stored in memory with other prestige brands in a superordinate
concept category. 
1 0
The concept of brand attitude is related to, but distinct from, brand
image. Brand attitude "is based on certain attributes such as durability,
incidence of defects, serviceability, features, performance, or 'fit and
finish."'111 Brand attitude differs from specific brand associations, however,
because it contains elements of affect not necessarily linked to a particular
attribute or association. Indeed, this affective component of brand attitude
may be stored and retrieved in memory separate from the underlying
attribute information.11 2 Several marketing scholars have concluded that
brand attitude is a global assessment (like or dislike) that operates at a
higher level of abstraction than particular product attributes.1 13 Perceived
quality, a third concept of consumer brand assessment, is also a global
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. For example, consumers might associate Lowenbrau with relaxing with good
friends; Mercedes with wealthy, discriminating people; and Toyota with Japan. Id. Brands like
Budweiser, Chevrolet, Levi's, and Bank of America also might have strong product-class
associations and those product-class associations may themselves have additional associations.
Id.
109. George S. Low & Charles W. Lamb, Jr., The Measurement and Dimensionality of Brand
Associations, 9J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 350, 352 (2000).
110. C.W. Park, B.J.Jaworski & D.J. Maclnnis, Strategic Brand Concept-Image Management, 50J.
MARKETING 135, 136 (1986).
111. Aaker &Keller, supra note 105, at 29.
112. Id.
113. Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End and
Synthesis of Evidence, 52J. MARKETING 2 (1988); Aaker & Keller, supra note 105, at 29.
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assessment of a product's overall excellence or superiority. 114 Perceived
quality obviously influences brand attitude, but brand attitude is also
influenced by consumers' assessments of other brand attributes and the
brand's position in the market.
These concepts of brand image, brand attitude, and consumer brand
assessment are clearly related, but research suggests that they behave as
separate dimensions in at least some circumstances. 115 In other words, while
brand image, brand attitude, and consumer brand assessment sometimes
(perhaps even often) move together-such that changes in brand image
impact brand attitude-they can change independently of one another.
Moreover, dimensionality appears to vary with familiarity; "well known
brands tend to exhibit multi-dimensional brand associations, consistent with
the idea that consumers have more developed memory structures for
familiar brands." 
116
B. THE RELEVANT LITERATURE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
Within the large body of marketing literature, studies focusing on the
impact of brand extensions or brand alliances offer particularly relevant
insight regarding trademark protection for non-competing goods. Brand
extension refers to the practice of introducing new products under existing
brands, 117 and brand extension studies measure consumer attitudes toward
a particular extension and/or toward the extended brand in light of the
brand extension. Brand alliances are "partnership [s] between two entities in
which efforts are combined for a common interest or to achieve a particular
aim." 118 These partnerships can take many forms, but the two most common
are joint promotions (McDonald's including toys in its Happy Meals based
on the KungFu Panda movie) and co-branding arrangements (Edy's Loaded
Cookie Dough Ice Cream with Nestle Toll House cookie dough). Like the
114. Low & Lamb, supra note 109, at 353; Zeithaml, supra note 113, at 3.
115. Low & Lamb, supra note 109, at 360.
116. Id. at 361 (noting that researchers commonly postulate that consumers have more
developed memory structures for these brands because they are "willing to expend more energy
in processing information regarding familiar brands compared to unfamiliar brands").
117. Some researchers distinguish between brand extensions and line extensions. In this
terminology, new products introduced in the same basic-level category as the parent brand
would be line extensions and new products in different basic-level categories would be brand
extensions. Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand
Extensions Have a Negative Impact, 57J. MARKETING 71, 74 n.3 (1993). The "basic" level "is the
one most easily recognized and discriminated by consumers." Id. at 74 (citation omitted). Thus,
the basic-level category for Coca-Cola might be "soda." A line extension then would be a new
type of soda offered under the COCA-COLA mark, such as Diet Coke. A brand extension would
involve introduction of a new juice product under the COCA-COLA mark. Brand extensions, in
this terminology, would thus be more remote from the original products than would line
extensions.
118. Nicole L. Votolato & H. Rao Unnava, Spillover of Negative Information on Brand Alliances,
16J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 196, 196 (2006).
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brand extension studies, the brand alliance studies measure consumer
attitudes toward the alliance product or service and/or the alliance partners
in light of information about the alliance product or one of the partners.
The brand extension and brand alliance studies are more useful here than
studies dealing specifically with likelihood of confusion because this Article
is concerned with the consequences of confusion for mark owners even when
consumers are confused about the source of non-competing goods that bear the
same or a similar mark.
To be clear, the brand extension and brand alliance studies have
obvious limitations-both methodologically and in terms of their
applicability to legal issues in trademark law. First, the studies frequently
involve hypothetical brands, hypothetical extensions (alliances), or both.
Since hypothetical brands are unfamiliar to the subjects and therefore lack
the associative networks of real brands, the results cannot necessarily be
extrapolated to the commercial marketplace. Indeed, some of the studies
themselves get different results in tests that involve hypothetical brands than
they do in those that involve real brands. 119
Second, subjects in these brand extension and brand reliance studies
receive limited information about the extensions (alliances) at issue, and
they encounter the extensions (alliances) in artificial environments that lack
the context consumers ordinarily would use to evaluate a product or service.
As one researcher noted, many of these studies attempt to determine the
effect of brand extension (alliance) information on subjects' evaluations of
the brand extensions (alliances) and parent brands by measuring attitudes
before and after subjects' exposures to "semantic brand extension
information of product category, brand attributes and sales results in
'Consumer Report' formats." 120 Constructing exposure in this way may be
methodologically necessary, but the subjects may react differently in this
119. See, e.g., Peter A. Dacin & Daniel C. Smith, The Effect of Brand Portfolio Characteristics on
Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 229, 239 (1994) (finding, in a
study involving hypothetical brands, that the number of products affiliated with a brand was
positively related to confidence and favorability of a brand extension, but failing to find such a
result in the context of real brands).
120. Joseph W. Chang, Will a Family Brand Image Be Diluted by an Unfavorable Brand Extension?
A Brand Trial-Based Approach, 29 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 299, 299 (2002); cf Rebecca
Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 529-
32 (2008) (describing the problems with extrapolating lab results to the commercial
marketplace and noting that, in one well-known study of dilution, "the test environment was
itself decontextualizing, depriving subjects of the cues they would ordinarily use to distinguish a
dilutive use from a senior mark"). Recent studies of other aspects of consumer behavior have
reflected the difficulty of translating lab results to real-world settings. See Ori Heffetz & Moses
Shayo, How Large Are Non-Budget-Constraint Effects of Prices on Demand? 4-5 (Mar. 19,
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Iowa Law Review) (finding in a lab experiment
that prices positively affected stated willingness to pay, but finding no such demand effects in a
field experiment and concluding that experimentally detectable price effects on demand may
be too small to matter in at least some real-world settings).
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context than they would if they encountered the relevant products in the
marketplace.
Third, many of the studies measure changes in subjects' attitudes rather
than changes in behavior. This raises questions about the practical
significance of the studies since research suggests there is little correlation
between attitude and behavior toward brands. 121 And while this is a problem
generally, the disconnect between attitudes and behavior is particularly
acute when the extension (alliance) information comes from an indirect
rather than direct product experience, as the information does in virtually
all of the brand extension and brand alliance studies.122 And even to the
extent findings relating to consumer attitudes merit consideration, there is
an additional reason to question their significance because the results
depend on subjects' predictions of their future feelings about a brand-
perhaps at their next purchasing opportunity-and research suggests people
are particularly bad at forecasting their feelings. 
123
Finally, the brand extension and alliance studies record subjects'
responses very shortly after they are exposed to new information, even
though research suggests post-experience advertising is very likely to affect
consumers' memories of the new information. 124 Specifically, post-
experience exposure to marketing messages is likely to cause those exposed
to the extension (alliance) information to misremember their earlier
experience with the extension (alliance), and to interpret that experience
more positively later on than they do immediately after their exposure. 125
121. Chang, supra note 120, at 299 (citing research demonstrating that the attitude-
behavior correlation is significant only when the product information comes from direct
experience). These findings are also relevant with regard to the purported harms of dilution,
since blurring-and especially tarnishment-is based on claims about how certain uses affect
consumers' attitudes towards brands.
122. Direct experience here refers to "product use from purchase, direct tests, sampling,
and other evaluation behaviors." Id. at 299 n.2. Indirect experiences include "advertising
exposure, personal selling presentations, exposure to displays, packages, and point-of-purchase
materials, [and] word-of-mouth." Id.
123. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing What to
Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005) (discussing various ways in
which people mispredict future emotional states, including "the impact bias, whereby people
overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions to future events-even
when they know what the future event is likely to entail and they are not in a particularly 'hot'
or 'cold' emotional state at the time of making their forecast" (emphasis omitted)). Some
speculation is involved even when studies involve real brands since they tend to use hypothetical
extensions, forcing respondents to declare how they would feel about a brand if the extension
happened.
124. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Braun-LaTour, Michael S. LaTour, Jacqueline E. Pickrell &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, How and When Advertising Can Influence Memory for Consumer Experience, 33J.
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These are real limitations, and they counsel caution in applying the
findings of the brand extension and alliance studies directly to the legal
issues in trademark law. Nevertheless, these studies remain the best available
evidence regarding the impact of uses of a mark outside its original context.
Since the arguments offered in favor of protection against non-competing
uses make essentially empirical claims, we should engage the literature and
understand its lessons. In doing so, however, we should remember that
expansive trademark protection has significant costs, both competitively and
in terms of the speech it restricts. 12 6 We should therefore demand good
evidence that the harms allegedly addressed by this protection are real.
Since the marketing literature discussed below is designed to help brand
owners enhance the value of their brands, it seems fair to assume that these
studies offer the best possible assessment of the impact of non-competitive
uses. Indeed, given their orientation toward brand owners-who are
generally plaintiffs in trademark lawsuits-any weaknesses in the studies
would seem to undermine the claim that these uses have real-world impact
and cut against broader protection.
V. LESSONS OF THE MARKETING LITERATURE
A. BRAND EXTENSION
As noted above, brand extension refers to the practice of introducing
new products under existing brands. Nike, Inc., for example, may want to
capitalize on consumer recognition of its NIKE mark, which the company
has used primarily for athletic shoes and apparel, by using the mark in
connection with new products or services, such as athletic training services.
Brand extension studies measure consumer attitudes toward a particular
extension and/or the extended brand in light of information about the
extension. Thus, a study might gauge consumer reaction to the hypothetical
extension of the NIKE brand to athletic training services by measuring
subjects' attitudes toward the new service and/or toward the NIKE brand
after they have been exposed to information about the extension.
Because the subjects in the brand extension studies are told the test
products are in fact real or proposed extensions of the known brand, the
studies offer insight into the consequences of true source confusion, in
which consumers believe the defendant's goods actually emanate from the
plaintiff. In fact, these studies almost certainly overstate the real-world
consequences of third-party use of a mark for non-competitive goods: since
the respondents in these studies have no doubts about the source of the
extensions at issue, the studies simulate one-hundred percent confusion.
126. For examples of the costs, see generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, for a
discussion of a number of cases in which mark owners asserted extreme claims and the costs of
sponsorship or affiliation claims.
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Trademark infringement cases almost never involve confusion anywhere
near that level. 
127
Two strands of the brand extension literature are relevant to arguments
about the harm of non-competitive uses. First are the studies which seek to
determine the conditions under which information about the existing
"parent" brand transfers to the new product, thereby reducing the costs of
entry and increasing the likelihood that consumers will accept the new
product or service. These studies attempt to measure spillover effects--that is,
they focus on the benefits that might accrue to a new product or service by
virtue of its being offered under a known brand name. These studies
therefore speak most directly to market preemption and free-riding
arguments.
A second set of studies focuses on the consequences of brand extension
for parent brands. More specifically, these studies attempt to determine
whether information about a brand extensions affect consumers'
perceptions of the extended brand. In other words, these studies measure
reciprocal spillover effects (or feedback effects)-running from the extension
products back to the parent brand. The feedback studies are most relevant
in evaluating arguments that confusion about the source of a defendant's
products will have reputational consequences for the mark owner.
1. Forward Spillover Effects
The first strand of brand extension studies focuses on the conditions
under which positive brand associations will transfer to new products. The
127. Courts generally articulate the relevant standard as a question of whether the
defendant's use is likely to cause confusion among "an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers." See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green
Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[T]he law has long demanded a showing that
the allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable
number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care."); McGregor-Doniger, Inc.
v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979) ("'[A]n appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the
goods.'" (quoting Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978))).
While there is no absolute quantitative threshold for determining what level of confusion is
"appreciable," courts have generally been persuaded by evidence of fifteen-percent confusion.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch., Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding "a
high possibility of confusion" between TEXON and EXXON where approximately fifteen
percent of the individuals surveyed associated the TEXON sign with EXXON, another twenty-
three percent associated the sign with gasoline, a gas station, or an oil company, and only seven
percent associated the sign with Texas Motor Exchange); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp.,
603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that survey results showing fifteen- to twenty-percent
confusion corroborates likelihood of confusion); James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater,
Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 279 (7th Cir. 1976) (noting that a fifteen-percent level of confusion is
neither small nor de minimis). In one case, the Second Circuit called evidence of 8.5%
confusion "strong evidence." Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway &
Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding
8.5% confusion "strong evidence" of a likelihood of confusion).
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most obvious lesson of this literature is that the goodwill associated with a
brand does not always transfer to extension of that brand.128 Rather, the
success of any particular extension is primarily a function of three factors:
(1) the perceived quality of the core brand; (2) the similarity or "fit" of the
proposed extension with the family (or core) brand; and (3) the perceived
credibility of the family brand. 129 Consumers favorably evaluate extension
products when the core brand is high quality and they perceive the
extension product as a good fit with existing products.
30 Conversely, when
an extension is not perceived as a good fit, the goodwill associated with the
core brand will not lead to favorable evaluations of the extension
products. 131
Fit in this context can be measured in terms of complementarity,
substitutability, and transferability. Complementarity refers to the extent to
which consumers view the extension product and the goods offered by the
parent brand as complements. 132 Products are complementary if both are
consumed jointly to satisfy some particular need.1 33 For example, ski
clothing is a complementary extension for the ROSSIGNOL brand, which
originally was known for downhill skis. 134 Substitutability refers to the extent
to which consumers view the extension product as a substitute for the goods
offered by the parent brand. 135 Substitute products tend to have common
applications and use contexts such that one product could replace the other
128. A quick note about terminology: these studies use "parent" brand, "core" brand, and
"family" brand more or less interchangeably. To the extent there is any distinction between
these terms it is that a "parent" brand is any brand that is extended (and intended to convey a
parent-child relationship); a "core" brand refers to the parent brand in its original context; and
a "family" brand is a brand under which more than one product or service is offered. Hence, a
"parent" brand could be a "core" brand if, before the extension, the brand is primarily known
in the context of a few products or services. A "parent" brand could also be a "family" brand if it
had already been applied to multiple products or services. The brand would be considered a
"family" brand after the extension since it would now encompass both pre-extension and post-
extension products or services. None of the studies, however, differentiates findings on the basis
of whether the extended brand is referred to as a "parent," "core," or "family" brand.
129. See Kevin Lane Keller & David A. Aaker, The Effects of Sequential Introduction of Brand
Extensions, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 35, 47 (1992) (discussing the factors that contribute to a
successful brand extension).
130. While in one study Aaker and Keller found that extensions from high-quality brands
may still be evaluated favorably even when they are somewhat more remote-that is, high-
quality core brands "stretch farther"-the relatively dissimilar products in that study were still
quite close to those offered under the core brand. See id. at 40-44 (testing extensions deemed
close, medium, and far from the core brand product, where ice cream was the "far" extension
of a brand known for potato chips).
131. Id. at 45.





in usage and satisfy the same needs. 13 6 Cross-country skis or ice skates
therefore would be substitute extensions for ROSSIGNOL. Finally,
transferability relates to the relevance of a brand owner's expertise in the
extension product category. 13 7 Specifically, transferability depends on the
extent to which consumers believe a parent brand owner can use its people,
facilities, and skills to make the new product or offer the new service. 138
Transferability is related to credibility, which is a function of perceived
expertise and trustworthiness. 1
3 9
In addition to these global measures of fit, consumer evaluation of an
extension product can depend on transfer of particular concrete (involving
tangible product characteristics) or abstract (involving intangible image
characteristics) brand attribute associations. 140 Extension evaluations will
depend primarily on whether the specific attribute or benefit associations
for the core brand are viewed as relevant in the extension product category
and, if so, how favorable those inferred associations are in the context of the
extension product.141 Consumers may value a particular brand association
highly in one context but not in another, even when there is fit between the
products or services. Despite the similarity between products, for example,
consumers may value thickness in tomato-based juices but not in children's
fruit-flavored drinks. 142 Likewise, pulp is related to high quality in orange
juice but to low quality in apple juice. 143 The extent to which particular
brand attribute associations transfer to the extension product therefore
depends "not only on the strength of the association" with the parent brand,
but also the "appropriateness of the association" in the new context and
"whether cues are present to activate an association." 144
Importantly, these variables of transferability depend substantially on
the nature of the respective products and how brand owners position them
in the marketplace. Whether global assessments of a parent brand will
benefit a new product depends on the nature of the new product and its fit
with the parent brand. Product characteristics also frequently determine
136. Id.
137. See Aaker & Keller, supra note 105, at 30 (discussing the importance of product classes
when determining complements).
138. Id.
139. Id. Perceived expertise and trustworthiness are highly correlated and may depend on
the perception of previous extensions. The effect of previous extensions on new extension
evaluation appears to depend more on the success of the previous extension than the relative
similarity of the intervening extension. Aaker and Keller found no differences in perceived
company credibility (and presumably in evaluations of proposed extensions) based on fit
between an intervening extension and the core brand. Id.
140. Id. at 36-37.
141. Id.
142. Aaker and Keller, supra note 105, at 28.
143. Id.; Zeithaml, supra note 113, at 7.
144. Aaker and Keller, supra note 105, at 29.
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whether relevant brand attribute associations-like "thickness"-will transfer
to the new product. Thus, while it is undeniably true that modern marketing
focuses on brand identity and producers' ability to create associations with a
brand, it is also abundantly clear that the products or services with which a
mark has been used are central components of any brand's meaning.
2. Negative Feedback and Brand Extension
A second, related line of literature deals with potential feedback effects
on an extended parent brand. This literature paints a complex picture and
offers somewhat contradictory lessons. One thing, however, is clear: no
general assumption about the effect of using a known mark for non-
competitive goods is warranted. As one set of researchers noted, "the data
suggest that dilution [of brand attribute beliefs] is a complex phenomenon,
emerging for certain types of brand extensions in only some types of
situations." 145
Research on feedback effects focuses on several different types of
effects. Some studies address the effect of negative or inconsistent brand
information on overall brand image or on global brand assessments like
"quality" or "success." 146 Other studies focus on the effects of new
information on specific brand attribute beliefs-such as a belief that
Neutrogena products are "mild." 147 This distinction between global
assessments and specific brand attribute beliefs is particularly important
here; extension information seems to have little effect on global brand
assessments, though inconsistent extension information may, in certain
circumstances, affect specific brand attribute beliefs, at least immediately
after exposure to such information.
a. Global Brand Assessments
Taking first the issue of a single, isolated extension, studies suggest that
consumers generally do not alter global brand assessments in light of
extension information. In one study by Jean Romeo, for example, negative
information about a brand extension had no effect on subjects' evaluations
of the family brand as compared to their evaluations of the brand before
learning about the extension. 148 Keller and Aaker similarly failed to find any
difference in core brand evaluations between subjects who received negative
information about an extension and others in a control group that had not
received any extension information. 1
49
145. Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand
Extensions Have a Negative Impact , 57J. MARKETING 71, 79 (1993).
146. Jean B. Romeo, The Effect of Negative Information on the Evaluations of Brand Extension and
the Family Brand, 18 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 399, 400 (1991).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 404-05.
149. Keller & Aaker, supra note 129, at 47.
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The situation is somewhat more complicated with respect to multiple or
successive extensions, but the lesson is largely the same: extension
information is unlikely to affect global assessments of a core brand.150 In
Keller and Aaker's study, successful brand extensions improved evaluations
of later extensions and of the core brand itself, at least when the core brand
was of average quality. 151 Unsuccessful intervening extensions led to lower
evaluations of later proposed extensions, but they did not affect evaluations
of the core brand, regardless of the core brand's quality level. 152 Thus, the
only apparent risk to a core brand from failed extension is that consumers
will evaluate future extensions more negatively than they otherwise might
have. 155 Moreover, subjects tended to find the core brand owner equally
credible even after receiving information about a brand extension they
regarded as a bad fit. 154
Significantly, even in the few cases in which negative information had
an impact on a parent brand, it did so only in an abstract sense. In
particular, negative information about an extension did not affect the
parent brand's image in the context of the goods the parent previously
offered. Thus, for example, Joseph Chang found that the general brand
image of the parent brand of Sprite products was diluted by both of two
unfavorable extension products: Sprite orangeades and Sprite dish-washing
detergent. 155 At the same time, however, neither unfavorable extension
damaged the image of Sprite lemonades, the original product offered under
the parent brand. 156 Such brand "dilution" can be considered a harm only
to the extent it might impact the brand owner's ability to extend its brand in
the future.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 43. Successful extensions had no impact on high-quality core brands. Id.
152. Id. at 46.
153. Id. Notably, even this risk appeared significant only for moderate-quality core brands.
Unsuccessful extensions had no impact on evaluation of extensions by high-quality brands. An
interesting parallel finding was that an unsuccessful extension, even when it affects credibility
and prevents the core brand from expanding to less similar products, does not appear to
prevent the core brand from "backtracking" and later introducing a more similar extension. Id.
at 48.
154. Keller & Aaker, supra note 129, at 44-45. In an odd set of additional findings, Keller
and Aaker find that evaluations of an average-quality core brand were significantly /ower when
the company had successfully introduced two extensions than when it had successfully
introduced one extension, even though perceptions of company credibility and product fit
were not significantly lower. Id. Conversely, evaluations of high quality core brands seemed
relatively unaffected by multiple unsuccessful extensions even though perceptions of company
credibility (with respect to further extensions) and fit were lower. Id. at 48. The authors suggest
these findings might be explained by contextual effects, and that more strongly held attributes
about the core brand (which may come from tests of real brands with which consumers had
actual experience) can be expected to show more resistance to contextual effects. Id.
155. Chang, supra note 120, at 302.
156. Id.
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The few studies that have found some effect on global brand
assessments have involved umbrella branding of extremely closely related
products. In one study, for example, Tfilin Erdem estimated a model using
scanner data regarding purchases of toothbrushes and toothpaste offered
under the same brand. 157 Erdem concluded that variance in the quality of
toothbrushes given away as free samples by a toothpaste brand owner had
some cross-category effects (i.e., consumers updated their quality
expectations of the toothpaste and bought less of it).1 5 8 But even here the
effects were "small in magnitude,"1 59 and that was in a study in which the
brand owner explicitly tied the extension product to the core product. 16
Thus, the most that can be said regarding the impact of extensions on global
brand assessments is that the extension may have feedback effects that are
small in magnitude in a few cases in which the extension product is very
closely related to the brand owner's pre-extension product offerings. 
161
b. Incongruity
In addition to the influence of product categories and the success or
failure of the extension, congruence between the extension and the parent
brand moderates the effect extension information has on the parent brand's
image. Congruence here is defined in terms of keeping with the dominant
concept of the brand, which is conceived of as primarily functional,




160. Erdem's study relied on purchase data after exposure to free toothbrush samples
provided explicitly by the brand owner. Id. Thus, not only was there no doubt regarding the
source of the toothbrushes, the brand owner aggressively tied the two products together.
Whether the same results would have ensued if consumers found the similarly branded
toothbrushes on their own is an open question.
161. Jean Romeo found in her study that negative information about an extension in the
same product category as the parent brand had a marginally significant negative effect on the
family brand image, though negative information about extension in a different product
category actually improved the parent brand image. Romeo, supra note 146, at 404. Romeo
claims that brand image might improve in the face of negative information about an extension
in a different product category because the negative information is inconsistent with subjects'
preexisting schemas and therefore "can be dismissed as due to temporary situational factors."
Id. at 405. In other words, consumers may simply conclude that the skills needed to make the
original product would not transfer to the product extension, and negative information about
the extension therefore was more reflective of the extension product than the original brand
image. Id. This explanation might plausibly explain why information about an extension in a
different product class would not have a negative impact on brand image, but it does not
explain improvement in brand image. Moreover, Romeo's explanation of this unexpected result
is oddly inconsistent with her earlier claim that negative information about similar products is
remembered precisely because of its inconsistency with the preexisting schema. See id. at 401
("[I]nconsistency which is unambiguous, strong, or evaluative, is even more likely to capture
attention and be remembered.").
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symbolic, or experiential. 162 Congruence differs from product-category-
related effects in that an extension could be seen as incongruent even when
it is in the same product class as the core product. Consumers might regard
a new Rolls-Royce economy car as incongruent with the ROLLS-ROYCE
brand image, even though the new car is in the same broad category as
Rolls-Royce luxury vehicles.
As Helge Thorbjornsen demonstrates, brand extensions that are
congruent with the original brand concept will have a more positive effect
on the parent brand than extensions that are not congruent. 163 In other
words, a congruent extension has greater positive feedback effects than an
incongruent extension. But it does not follow that incongruence between
the extension and the parent brand necessarily harms the parent brand.
Rather, the effect of incongruence depends on consumers' motivation to
process information about the extension, which is primarily a function of
familiarity with the parent brand. According to Thorbj0rnsen, consumers
are less motivated to process information about less familiar brands, and
unmotivated consumers tend not to exert the effort necessary to assimilate
new information, instead using a "sub-typing" strategy. 164 That is, when a
brand extension is atypical, consumers with low motivation are likely to
resolve the incongruity by forming a sub-type-storing the information
about the extension in a separate cognitive category. 165 When consumers
create such sub-types, the parent brand is effectively insulated from
feedback.
The feedback effect on highly familiar brands is unclear. Thorbjornsen
argues that consumers are more highly motivated to process information
about well-known brands and therefore may process incongruent
information more thoroughly and assimilate the new information into the
parent brand category. 166 On this theory, incongruent extensions are likely
to have greater impact on parent brand image when brand familiarity is high
rather than low. Put differently, Thorbjornsen hypothesizes that feedback
effects are a greater concern for strong brands.
But the conclusion that incongruence has negative consequences for a
well-known parent brand is in tension with other research showing that
unfavorable incongruent extensions did not cause negative evaluations of
162. Helge Thorbjornsen, Brand Extensions: Brand Concept Congruency and Feedback Effects
Revisited, 14J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 250, 250-51 (2005); see also Henrik Sj6din & Fredrik
T6rn, When Communication Challenges Brand Associations: A Framework for Understanding Consumer
Responses to Brand Image Incongruity, 5 J. CONSUMER BEHAv. 32, 38 (2006) (noting that brand
image incongruity affects consumers' attitude towards the brand).
163. Thorbjornsen, supra note 162, at 252.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 254-55.
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the parent brand. 167 Indeed, after reviewing the relevant literature to distill
"main tendencies," Henrik Sjtdin and Fredrik T6rn conclude that negative
evaluation of incongruent extension information will not affect evaluation of
the parent brand.168 The authors explain this somewhat counterintuitive
result by suggesting consumers generally use a sub-typing strategy to resolve
incongruous information-not only when the parent brand is unfamiliar. 169
But whether or not sub-typing explains the lack of impact on well-known
brands, Sj6din and T6rn's conclusion that incongruous information is
unlikely to impact parent brands fits more comfortably with other research
demonstrating that well-known brands are quite resistant to change. 170 It
therefore seems unlikely that incongruence negatively impacts many brands,
whether those brands are familiar or not.
It would be odd to focus on a phenomenon that affects, at most, a small
number of highly familiar brands to justify claims against non-competing
goods generally, particularly because other research suggests that consumers
with high levels of involvement are less likely to be confused by uses of a
similar mark in the first place-or at least are likely to be confused by
different types of similarity than are consumers in low-involvement
situations. According to Daniel Howard, Roger Kerin, and Charles
Gengler, 171 consumers in high-involvement situations 172 are unlikely to be
167. Chang, supra note 120, at 302-03.
168. Sj6din & Tbrn, supra note 162, at 35, 38.
169. See id. (positing that "although the brand evaluation is not affected by the evaluation
of the incongruent element, there may still be an opportunity for brand image to influence
brand evaluations").
170. See Stephen J. Hoch, Product Experience Is Seductive, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 448, 451
(2002) ("Using a simple associative learning procedure, [the authors] showed that, in a few
trials, people learn brand associations that later block the learning of new predictive attribute
associations."). Even Jacob Jacoby, perhaps dilution's biggest supporter, admits that truly well-
known marks are essentially unshakable. Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution:
Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 265, 274 (2000) ("It
appears that very strong brands are immune to dilution because their memory connections are
so strong that it is difficult for consumers to alter them or create new ones with the same brand
name."). There is abundant evidence outside the branding context of the robustness of initial
judgments. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 646-54 (1999) (discussing a number of
empirical demonstrations of the persistence of initial judgments, even in the face of
contradictory or ambiguous hard data). Even conscious consumers who try to reason through
additional information are unlikely to change their perceptions; attempts at rationalization may
actually serve to increase confidence in a faulty intuitive judgment, a phenomenon known as
confirmation bias. See id. at 647-50, 660-62; Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-
and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 311, 312 (2006)
("[P]eople evaluate hypotheses by trying to confirm them.").
171. Daniel J. Howard, Roger A. Kerin & Charles Gengler, The Effects of Brand Name
Similarity on Brand Source Confusion: Implications for Trademark Infringement, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y &
MARKETING 250, 252 (2000).
172. The authors manipulated levels of involvement in two ways. First, participants in the
study were told they were going to be entered into a drawing as a reward for their participation.
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confused by use of a mark that is similar to the core mark in sight or sound,
though relatively more likely to be confused by uses of marks that are similar
in meaning. 173
In fact, the small amount of confusion the authors found was probably
more than would naturally arise. Howard, Kerin, and Gengler tested
confusion by showing participants a variety of goods, including two different
brands of drain cleaner and two different brands of car wax. 174 They varied
the difference between the two brands such that the second sometimes was
similar to the first in meaning (Hurricane vs. Cyclone) and sometimes in
sound (Hurricane vs. Hurri-Drain). 175 The authors then measured
confusion about common source by telling study participants the following:
The first set of products you reviewed yesterday included a brand of
drain cleaner (car wax). The second set of products you just
reviewed also included a brand of drain cleaner (car wax). How
likely or unlikely is it that those two brands of drain cleaner (car
wax) were made by the same company? 
176
They then scored the responses on a seven-point scale ranging from "very
likely" (1) to "very unlikely" (7).177 This formulation likely led to higher
levels of reported confusion than might have arisen naturally, since the
question seems to have primed respondents to consider common source. It
is also unclear how much of the confusion that was reported was caused by
brand name similarity, since the authors used the same trade dress for all of
the test objects (both drain cleaners, for example). 
178
Putting this research together with that regarding the effects of
incongruity suggests both that consumers are unlikely to be confused by
similarity in circumstances of high involvement, 179 when harm is most likely
to follow from confusion, and that confusion is unlikely to be harmful in
those cases where confusion is more probable.
Id. at 255. High-involvement subjects were told the drawing winners would receive $50 of any
brand drain cleaner or car wax presented in the study. Id. Drain cleaner and car wax were the
two products tested in the study. Id. at 254. Low-involvement subjects were told the drawing
would be for $50 of any brand of carpet spot-stain cleaner used in the study. Id. at 255. Second,
as a check, participants were asked on the second page of the response booklet to indicate
whether "[t]he drain cleaning (car wax) products [were] relevant to [theml/not relevant to
[them] and personally involving/not personally involving." Id.
173. Id. at 261.
174. Id. at 254.
175. Id. at 255.
176. Howard, Kerin & Gengler, supra note 171, at 255.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 257-58 (mentioning that the brand name was the only thing altered between
like test objects).
179. If Thorbjornsen is correct that high familiarity correlates with higher involvement,
then it seems probable that consumers are less likely to be confused about third-party uses that
are similar to familiar brands only in sight or sound.
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c. Specific Brand Beliefs
While new extension information does not tend to impact global brand
attitudes, it can affect specific brand beliefs.180 An extension, for example,
might not affect consumers' overall evaluations of the NEUTROGENA
brand, but it may impact their belief that NEUTROGENA products are
"mild" (if, for example, NEUTROGENA offered a shampoo product
consumers considered "harsh").18 1 Like in the case of overall assessments,
however, any impact on specific brand beliefs tends to be limited to the
parent brand generally; there is little or no impact on the brand in the
context of particular products. Thus, even if an extension affects consumers'
general association of "mildness" with the NEUTROGENA brand, it is
unlikely to affect their belief that NEUTROGENA hand lotion is mild. The
only sense in which this abstract effect could have any real-world
consequences would be in limiting the future extendibility of the brand.
d. Reasons to Think Feedback Harms Will Be Insignificant
i. Studies Regarding Global Assessments Are More Relevant
It is worth emphasizing here that the majority of studies that show any
feedback effects focus on specific brand attributes rather than global
evaluations of quality. These studies therefore measure different effects than
those typically claimed in support of trademark protection against non-
competing goods. The standard feedback arguments focus on consumer
assessments of quality, suggesting that the poor quality of the junior user's
products or services will be attributed to the parent brand. Even the control
arguments focus on quality control. Consequently, studies like Aaker and
Keller's, which measure perceived quality directly and focus on global brand
assessments, are more specifically relevant to the arguments advanced by
courts and commentators in favor of trademark protection against non-
competing uses.
And it is not simply that these studies are more responsive to the
standard arguments. As a matter of fact, though they draw the wrong
conclusions, advocates of broader protection are right to focus on global
assessments rather than specific attributes. Research suggests that consumers
evaluating a new product tend to rely on global attitudes toward a brand
rather than attempting to recall and process specific brand attributes.
182
180. Eva Martinez & Jos6 M. Pina, The Negative Impact of Brand Extensions on Parent Brand
Image, 12 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 432, 437-38 (2003) (referring to studies by Keller and
Aaker in 1992 and Loken and John in 1993).
181. Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand
Extensions Have a Negative lmpact, 57J. MARKETING 71, 72 (1993).
182. See Girish N. Punj & Clayton L. Hillyer, A Cognitive Model of Consumer-Based Brand Equity
for Frequently Purchased Products: Conceptual Framework and Empirical Results, 14 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 124, 125 (2004) (stating that consumers tend to rely predominately on attitudes
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Thus, junior uses that affect consumers' global evaluations of a brand would
have a greater impact on a brand owner's ability to expand into other
markets than would uses that merely affect particular attribute associations.
Yet the research suggests third-party uses are unlikely to impact global brand
attitudes.
There is one additional reason to believe Aaker and Keller's study is
more relevant than the studies focusing on specific brand attributes.
Because they gave the subjects in their study little information about the
core brand and the extensions they were testing, Aaker and Keller's findings
"are most representative of low involvement consumer decision settings
where consumers lack the motivation and/or ability to judge the extension
and where source effects have been shown to have an important influence
on attitudes."18 3 These low-involvement situations in which consumers are
likely to sub-type the extension information are precisely the situations in
which consumers are most likely to be confused.
ii. Sub-Branding as a Moderating Factor
Because the brand extension studies seek to measure the impact of
extensions of known brands, these studies involve extension products that
bear the exact same mark as the parent. This is an important point because
many trademark infringement cases do not involve identical marks.
Frequently plaintiffs complain about a defendant's use of a somewhat
different trademark or a similar mark used in conjunction with other
distinguishing features, such as a house mark or distinctive packaging. And
it turns out that small changes to a mark or packaging can make a very big
difference in how consumers process the new mark.
Several studies have found that differentiating the extension product
from the parent brand by adding to or altering the stimulus is effective in
preventing any feedback effects on the parent brand. 184 One study, for
example, evaluated the impact of information about luxury automobile
brand owners' plans to offer lower-priced models on subjects' perceptions of
the luxury brands (BMW and ACURA). Though the authors did find some
negative feedback when subjects were told only that BMW (ACURA) was
introducing a new car, addition of a sub-brand such as "Ultra by BMW" was
sufficient to insulate the parent brand from any negative effects. ' 85 Subjects
reacted negatively to the lower-priced extension products, but their
perceptions of the parent brand were not affected when the extension
toward a brand when evaluating new products); see also Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and
the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1227, 1260 (2008).
183. Keller & Aaker, supra note 129, at 48.
184. See, e.g., Amna Kirmani, Sanjay Sood & Sheri Bridges, The Oumership Effect in Consumer
Responses to Brand Line Stretches, 63 J. MARKETING 88, 89-90 (1999) (discussing various studies
dealing with the effect of brand extension on the parent brand).
185. Id. at94-95.
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products were sub-branded. In other words, even though they knew that
BMW (ACURA) was in fact the source of the sub-branded extension
product,1 86 subjects responded to the sub-branding strategy by sub-typing,
effectively insulating the parent brand from any feedback effects. 
187
This research suggests that consumers are relatively adept at
recognizing attempts to differentiate and they are able to categorize brand
attitudes finely when they are encouraged to do so. Thus, any risk of
negative feedback is even further diminished to the extent the junior use is
not identical to the parent mark or accompanied by other signals of
differentiation-perhaps through use of a known house mark or a different
stylized logo.
iii. Marketing Activities Modulate Memory
Studies that have found a feedback effect measured subjects' reactions
very shortly after they were exposed to information about the extension. As a
practical matter, it may be impossible to test any other way. But the
immediacy of the subjects' responses dilutes the significance of the findings,
since consumers' memories of their experiences with brand extensions are
very likely to be significantly affected by post-exposure events, including later
exposure to marketing information.1 8 8 Particularly with respect to well-
established brands-the "strong" brands for which trademark law provides
the most protection-the post-exposure events consumers are most likely to
encounter will be advertisements for the parent brand. Consumers'
memories of their experiences with the extension product are therefore
186. Rebecca Tushnet argues that this research regarding sub-branding suggests that
dilution by tarnishment is unlikely because "recognizing an absence of affiliation should allow
consumers to avoid penalizing the senior brand." Tushnet, supra note 120, at 544. But the
research actually supports an even stronger point: the parent brands in these studies were not
diluted even when subjects believed the extension products actually came from the same
company. Bradford, supra note 182, at 1274 n.230 In other words, these studies suggest that
parent brands are not harmed when consumers have reasons to differentiate whether or not
consumers are confused about affiliation. Id.
187. See Sandra J. Milberg, C. Whan Park & Michael S. McCarthy, Managing Negative
Feedback Effects Associated with Brand Extensions: The Impact of Alternative Branding Strategies, 6 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 119, 119 (1997) (finding that sub-branding may prevent negatively
evaluated extensions from harming the parent brand). Bradford suggests that these studies
might not adequately account for accrued brand fatigue (or "wearout"), which would take time
to develop and would not be captured by the responses to information about particular
individual extensions. See Bradford, supra note 182. Even if that is true, it is more of an
argument for a dilution by blurring claim than one based on a likelihood of confusion.
188. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-Year
Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361, 364 (2005) (discussing
studies which demonstrated subjects could be led to believe they had met Bugs Bunny at a
Disney resort-even though Bugs Bunny is a Warner Brothers, and not a Disney, character-by
showing the subjects an advertisement that featured Bugs Bunny and inviting them to
"Remember the Magic").
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likely to be altered over time, and any effect on a well-known mark is likely
to be small and short-lived.
iv. Small Risk of Harm x Low Likelihood of Confusion
As the foregoing sections detailed, the evidence of harm to a mark
owner from a non-competing use is weak. It might be tolerable for courts to
enforce rights against non-competing goods in spite of the weakness of this
evidence if courts required relatively high levels of confusion to support a
claim. But the reality is quite the opposite: courts have sustained claims
when the evidence showed remarkably low levels of confusion. 189 Where the
risk of feedback harm is small and the likelihood of confusion is low, the
probability of harm in a particular case is exceedingly small, and
enforcement in these circumstances is very likely wasteful.
3. Potential Benefits of Third-Party Uses
Even if we were prepared to accept that some uses of a mark for non-
competitive products could cause harm to a mark owner, that harm must be
weighed against any benefits mark owners might derive from such uses. And
at least one strand of the literature suggests pretty clearly that, as long as the
mark is not used by others in connection with negative images, any use of a
mark by others actually increases the value of the mark. 190
Specifically in the context of brand extension, Maureen Morrin found
that exposure to extension information actually facilitated parent brand
retrieval by activating the parent brand's associational network. 19 1 While
non-dominant brands seemed to benefit more from the facilitation effects of
extensions, dominant brands benefited as well. 192 Also, for non-dominant
brands, while high-fit extensions had greater facilitating effects than low-fit
extensions, even low-fit extensions facilitated matching as compared to pre-
exposure levels. For dominant brands, fit did not seem to affect
categorization speed, which generally increased after exposure to the
extension. This research suggests third-party use of a mark that reminds
189. See supra note 127 (listing cases finding infringement based on confusion levels as low
as fifteen percent).
190. Trademark infringement claims are not necessary to deal with those that involve uses
in connection with negative images, as those are precisely the uses to which the tarnishment
branch of dilution law is targeted. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006) (defining "dilution by
tarnishment" as "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark").
191. Maureen Morrin, The Impact of Brand Extensions on Parent Brand Memory Structures and
Retrieval Processes, 36J. MARKETING REs. 517, 520 (1999).
192. Id. at 521 (noting that respondents were able to match'non-dominant parent brands to
categories approximately 641 milliseconds faster after exposure to extension information and
dominant parent brands 247 milliseconds faster). Dominance here refers to the extent to which
a particular brand is recalled in response to a category cue: a dominant brand, like CREST, is
one that tends to be recalled first when prompted with the category cue, like "toothpaste."
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consumers of the senior mark facilitates retrieval of the parent mark and
makes it more salient.
At the affective level, several studies indicate that mere familiarity with a
mark increases its likeability. 193 There may be rational explanations for this
phenomenon-consumers may believe that brands are familiar precisely
because they have been around a long time and therefore stand for
reliability. 194 But it may also be that individuals simply come to believe that
they like what they are familiar with, probably because relying on familiarity
saves them cognitive resources. Whatever the reason, third-party use of a
mark is likely to increase familiarity to the extent consumers believe the
same company is behind both uses, thereby increasing the brand's likability
in direct proportion to the extent the use causes confusion.
Finally, consumers may see incongruent extension information as
challenging, which may renew their interest in well-known brands that had
become boring. 195 Challenging, incongruous information will require
additional mental effort to determine how the information fits with the
previously established brand image, which may increase the salience of the
brand in memory. Such an increase in salience would enhance brand
attitude. 
196
193. See Bradford, supra note 182, at 1262-66 (describing the effect of familiarity and
noting that consumers' "most common deciding factor is brand familiarity").
194. Some research suggests that highly priced and heavily advertised brands are correlated
with consumer perception of quality. See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price & Advertising
Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796, 799 (1986) (finding that consumers infer
product quality from price and advertising volume). It should be noted that this correlation is
between highly priced and heavily advertised goods and consumer perception of quality, not
necessarily actual product quality.
195. See Sj6din & T6rn, supra note 162, at 38.
196. Id. Some have speculated that any affective benefit could eventually become a liability
because it causes over-familiarity and leads to boredom. See Bradford, supra note 182, at 1275. It
is unclear from the literature, however, whether such a wearout effect exists at all and, more
specifically, the extent to which it affects familiar, as opposed to unfamiliar, brands. See Douglas
Scott & Debbie Solomon, What Is Wearout Anyway?, 38 J. ADVERTISING RES. 19 (1998). The
research that supports a wearout effect focuses on exposure to advertising information, and it is
not clear that repeat exposure to the same or a similar mark in different contexts would have
the same effect. See Bobby J. Calder & Brian Sternthal, Television Commercial Wearout, 17 J.
MARKETING RES. 173, 185 (1980) (noting that evaluations of television commercials and
advertised products became more negative after multiple repetitions); Margaret C. Campbell &
Kevin Lane Keller, Brand Familiarity and Advertising Repetition, 30 J. CONSUMER RES. 292 (2003)
(arguing that overuse of promotional strategies could lead to wearout because market entrants
are more likely to choose those strategies known to produce wearout effects). But even
accepting for the sake of argument that wearout is possible, the research suggests the risk comes
from unvaried exposure. To the extent the junior use varies from the parent brand, even if it is
noticeably similar, the wearout risk seems quite small. Finally, at a more conceptual level, the
wearout risk, if it exists, has much more to say about a dilution-by-blurring claim, since
boredom from repeated exposure seems to have nothing to do with whether consumers
attribute the repeated information to the same source. That is, if there is a wearout risk, it could
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These conclusions help explain the findings of Subramanian
Balachander and Sanjoy Ghose, whose research shows that offering and
advertising new products under one brand creates positive reciprocal
spillover benefits for other products offered under the parent brand
umbrella. 197 That is, the mere existence of the second product, or of
information about that new product, activates the informational nodes
related to the brand in memory and benefits other products offered under
the brand. 198 This positive effect may in some cases be offset by substitution
effects; if the new product could be used as a substitute for the old product,
introduction of the new product may depress demand for the older product
(as a new Jaguar model may depress demand for used models). But such
offsetting effects would only arise in cases where the junior product was an
acceptable substitute for the senior (i.e., where the junior product is quite
similar to the senior). Those are likely to be cases in which the parties are in
competition-not the non-competitive uses on which I have focused.
Moreover, even when these substitution effects are present, it is not obvious
which effect-substitution or spillover-will be stronger.
These benefits obviously do not compel the conclusion that third-party
uses should always be allowed. But they do suggest the impact of third-party
uses on a mark owner is more complicated than generally presumed. And in
combination with the relatively weak evidence of harm to mark owners, they
suggest a greater role for consumer interests in the determination of which
third-party uses ought to be actionable.
B. BRAND ALLIANCES AND AFFILIATIONRELATIONSHIPS
Brand alliances, as previously noted, are "partnership [s] between two
entities in which efforts are combined for a common interest or to achieve a
particular aim." 199 The brand alliance studies are therefore particularly
relevant to the set of trademark cases involving sponsorship or affiliation
confusion-where consumers are not likely to believe the mark owner is the
actual source of the defendant's goods or services but might be confused
about a relationship between the parties. And like the brand extention
studies, the brand alliance studies can be separated into two strands: those
that measure consumer reaction to the alliance product or services, and
arise from unvaried exposure to a mark regardless of whether the later use is actionable as
trademark infringement.
197. Subramanian Balachander & Sanjoy Ghose, Reciprocal Spillover Effects: A Strategic Benefit
of Brand Extensions, 67J. MARKETING 4, 9 (2003).
198. Id. at 11. In fact, Balachander and Ghose find that the reciprocal-spillover benefit to
the parent brand is stronger than the forward-spillover effect on the junior use, which was not
demonstrated in the study in any event. ld. This means that the benefits to the senior user from
the extension actually exceeded the benefits to the extension product of using a known name.
Id.
199. Votolato & Unnava, supra note 118, at 196.
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those that measure consequences for the alliance partners of negative
information about the alliance product or an alliance partner (feedback
effects). The following sections address these two strands separately.
1. Forward Spillover Effects
Brand alliance studies confirm that certain alliances have synergistic
effects, positively influencing consumers' evaluations of the alliance product
or service in ways neither alliance partner could on its own. These studies
suggest that consumers' evaluations of brand alliances depend on
preexisting attitudes towards the alliance partners as individual entities (and
particularly their levels of perceived quality) and on the fit of the brands in
the alliance.2 00 Specifically, brands prove beneficial to a brand alliance if
they can "signal high quality cues that transfer to the other alliance brand,
or provide information on product attributes that benefits the alliance."
2 01
Indeed, transfer of perceived quality is enhanced when brands fit
together.
202
Fit in the context of brand alliances, like in the brand extension
context, can relate to the types of products or services consumers' primarily
associate with the alliance partners or to brand personality characteristics.
20 3
And fit in both senses can enhance consumer evaluations of the alliance
product or service. Subjects in one study, for example, had more positive
reactions to an alliance between Filofax and Sony to offer an electronic
personal organizer than an alliance between Filofax and Calvin Klein to
offer the same product. 20 4 At the same time, consumers are likely to react
more positively to either of those alliances-Filofax and Sony or Filofax and
Calvin Klein-than to an electronic organizer offered jointly by Calvin Klein
and Vidal Sassoon, neither of which offers any expertise in electronics.
2 0 5
In the context of arguments about sponsorship or affiliation confusion,
this research suggests some third-party uses that appear to consumers to
reflect a brand alliance stand to benefit from that perception where the
perceived alliance is viewed as a good fit. Put differently, third-party uses that
appear to reflect an alliance with the mark owner may be received more
favorably by consumers than they otherwise would have been.
200. A.R. Rao & R.W. Ruekert, Brand Alliances as Signals of Product Quality, 36 SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 87, 92 (1994); B.L. Simonin & J.A. Ruth, Is a Company Known by the Company It Keeps?
Assessing the Spillover Effects of Brand Alliances on Consumer Brand Attitudes, 35 J. MARKETING RES.
30,32 (1998).
201. David 0. James, Madge Lyman & Susan K. Foreman, Does the Tail Wag the Dog? Brand
Personality in Brand Alliance Evaluation, 15J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 173, 174 (2006).
202. L.P. Bucklin & S. Sengupta, Organizing Successful Co-Marketing Alliances, 57 J.
MARKETING 32, 33 (1993).
203. James, Lyman & Foreman, supra note 201, at 175.
204. Id. at 176.
205. Id.
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2. Reciprocal Feedback Effects
The most relevant research on potential negative feedback from
sponsorship or affiliation relationships comes from studies of the effect of
negative information about brand alliance partners. As this research reveals,
the case for a general assumption of harm to a mark owner is even weaker in
this context than in the cases where consumers might be confused about
actual source.
In one study, for example, Nicole Votolato and H. Rao Unnava focused
on the consequences to an alliance partner of negative information about a
supplier or a celebrity endorser of the partner's products. 20 6 Specifically, the
authors sought to measure the effects on consumers' attitudes toward a
fictitious clothing company from information that the company's partners
had behaved immorally or were incompetent. 20 7 Their conclusion was
simple, if remarkable: negative information does not have any feedback effect on the
partner absent some additional information about the partner's culpability for the
failing, regardless of whether the information relates to competence or moral failings
and regardless of whether the information is about another company or a person with
which the partner is associated. As the authors note:
[A] host brand may generally be quite impervious to negative
publicity surrounding its partner brand; the host brand [in the
study] was only affected when participants were led to believe that
the host knew of and condoned the partner's behavior. Spillover
from the partner brand to the host brand did not occur unless this
condition was present.208
Recall that this finding comes from a study in which respondents were
told explicitly that the host brand had a relationship with the alliance
partner about which the negative information was provided. Thus, there was
no ambiguity about affiliation; respondents understood that the host brand
was affiliated with the partner. What this suggests very clearly is that spillover
206. Votolato & Unnava, supra note 118, 196-202.
207. Previous research suggested to the authors that consumers might react differently to
different types of negative information-information about competence, on the one hand, and
moral misdeeds on the other. See id. at 197; T. J. Brown & P. A. Dacin, The Company and the
Product: Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses, 61 J. MARKETING 68, 76 (1997)
(noting that the more positively a consumer feels about a company offering a mediocre
product, the more negatively they will feel about the product); Bogdan Wojciszke, Hanna Brycz
& Peter Borkenau, Effects of Information Content and Evaluative Extremity on Positivity and Negativity
Biases, 64J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 327, 327 (1993) (stating that negative behavior is
more informative than positive behavior). Specifically, this earlier research suggested that
consumers react more negatively to competence-based information than moral failures when
the target of the information is a company; just the reverse is true when the target of the
information is a person. Votolato & Unnava, supra note 118, at 197.
208. Votolato & Unnava, supra note 118, at 201. These findings, as the authors also note,
may help explain why spillover effects are not frequently reported in practice. Id.
[2009]
TESTING MODERN TRADEMARK LAW'S THEORY OF HARM
is unlikely to occur absent some information-additional information,
beyond the mere fact of association-demonstrating the host brand's
specific culpability. In other words, as Votolato and Unnava note,
"consumers do not routinely blame a host brand for its partner's
mistakes."
209
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LITERATURE FOR TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY
Taken as a whole, the brand extension and brand alliance studies fail to
support a general presumption of harm to a mark owner from use of the
mark by non-competitors. First, the evidence suggests that reputational
feedback is unlikely, particularly in terms of consumers' global quality
assessments of a brand. There is some chance that a use for noncompeting
goods may affect particular brand attribute associations, but the evidence
suggests any such feedback will primarily affect the mark owner's ability to
extend the brand to new products in the future and will not dilute demand
for existing products. To the extent there are exceptions to the general rule
that non-competing uses do not impact assessments of the brand, they
involve products that, while not identical, are extremely closely related-like
toothbrushes and toothpaste. Moreover, the parent brand is generally
insulated from any negative feedback that might otherwise arise when the
junior mark is not identical to the parent brand or is combined with other
matter such as a house mark or a logo. Finally, the literature demonstrates
that at least some additional uses of a mark may generate positive, rather
than negative, feedback for the parent brand. Those positive effects need to
be accounted for in determining the net harm caused by uses of a mark for
non-competitive goods.
At the same time, the literature offers some support for the claim that a
junior user will benefit from the goodwill established by the parent brand in
its core market. Some extension products will be evaluated more favorably
by consumers because of the associations consumers already have with the
parent brand. Likewise, alliances between certain brands can have
synergistic effects such that the alliance product is evaluated more favorably
than the product would be if it was offered by either alliance partner
individually. In both situations-those of brand extensions and brand
alliances-the benefits to the new products or services depend in substantial
part on the relationship between the new and old products and the
associations consumers have with those products.
Framed in terms of the arguments typically offered in support of claims
against non-competing goods, the literature supports the view that third-
209. Id. at 198. At least some of the benefits discussed above might accrue in the context of
uses that suggest some kind of brand alliance. Specifically, such uses seem likely to increase
familiarity, which may make the mark owner's brand more likeable and more salient. See supra
Part V.A.3.
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party uses of a mark can, in some cases, interfere with the mark owner's
ability to expand in the future. Such uses might preempt directly by
occupying the market into which the senior mark owner would like to
expand. But it is also possible that the third-party uses will interfere with
future use by impacting particular brand attribute associations such that the
brand personality no longer is a good fit in the anticipated market.
These conclusions raise obvious normative questions regarding the
scope of trademark rights. At a minimum they suggest that courts ought to
emphasize the similarity of the goods factor in the likelihood of confusion
analysis much more heavily than they do. The brand extension literature
suggests that, if quality feedback happens at all, it is only in cases that involve
very closely related goods. And even if we accept that market preemption is a
legitimate concern, preemption depends heavily on the fit between the
junior and senior uses. Yet according to Barton Beebe's empirical research
"the similarity of the marks factor is by far the most important factor in the
multifactor test," and "a finding of bad faith intent creates, if not in
doctrine, then at least in practice, a nearly un-rebuttable presumption of a
likelihood of confusion." 210 This seems, in light of the marketing research,
entirely misguided. Clearly there must be some similarity between the
plaintiff's and defendant's marks for there to be infringement. But the
marketing research tells us that even identity between the marks will not
matter unless there is fit between the parties' goods. Similarity of the goods
therefore ought to be regarded as a threshold issue, particularly since intent
is such a malleable concept and courts have found no systematic way to
evaluate similarity of the marks.211
Putting proximity of the goods at the forefront also would require
courts to define that concept in terms of fit, focusing on complementarity,
substitutability, and transferability. While Beebe's research suggests a
relationship between courts' findings on similarity of goods and likelihood
of confusion, it does not disclose courts' methodology for determining
similarity of goods.212 Anecdotally, we can see courts finding similarity in a
variety of ways, including by taking into account whether the junior user's
goods are those that might be licensed. 2 13 By defining similarity in such an
open-ended way, courts effectively discount the importance of the similarity
of goods without being transparent about it.
210. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1623 (2006).
211. Id. at 1625 (describing the similarity analysis as "a frustratingly nebulous and
unsystematic inquiry, one that is typically little more than an exercise in abstract formal
comparison").
212. Id.
213. Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[S]ince modem
marketing methods tend to unify widely different types of products in the same retail outlets or
distribution networks, this factor is not of overriding importance." (citation omitted)).
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At a more conceptual level, this literature suggests that if producer
interests are to continue to influence the scope of trademark protection,
courts must confront squarely market preemption and free-riding
arguments, since those arguments have much more empirical support than
the reputational feedback arguments. These arguments need to be
separated out and evaluated on their own terms as grounds for determining
the scope of trademark protection, not least because they push in different
directions than do the quality feedback arguments. Specifically, the market
preemption and free-riding arguments are arguments about market
allocation, and market allocation decisions need not depend on consumer
confusion. Indeed, these arguments bear much greater resemblance to the
standard justifications for patent and copyright, which focus on the
incentives of creators and inventors. Thus, accepting market preemption
justifications for trademark law opens the door to radical doctrinal
reorientation that de-emphasizes confusion as the defining characteristic.
If we are not prepared to recognize free-riding and market preemption
arguments as the basis for determining the scope of trademark protection,
then consumer-based arguments ought to take on greater relative
significance in the context of non-competing goods. The consumer-based
arguments, however, need to focus more clearly than they have on the
nature of consumers' interests in avoiding certain types of confusion,
because not all confusion actually interferes with consumers' ability to make
decisions in the marketplace. On the one hand, uses that cause confusion
about responsibility for the quality of particular goods or services are very
likely to materially affect consumers' decision-making. Those uses should
therefore be actionable, even if they are for goods that do not compete
directly with the mark owner's. 214 Any cases in which the goods or services
are sufficiently closely related as to raise the possibility of producer harm in
terms of quality feedback will almost certainly fall within this category. Uses
that do not cause confusion about quality, on the other hand, do not
obviously impact consumers' decision-making such that they should
necessarily be actionable. Thus, rather than including all cases involving
alleged confusion regarding any type of relationship, trademark doctrine
ought to be structured to differentiate between types of confusion. By
separating out the consumer interests and evaluating them on their own
terms, we have the opportunity to draw the relevant distinctions. And it is
long past time that we do so.
214. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8.
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